Re: [PATCH bpf-next v6 2/3] bpf: Avoid faultable build ID reads under mm locks

From: Andrii Nakryiko

Date: Fri May 22 2026 - 14:21:22 EST


On Fri, May 22, 2026 at 11:05 AM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 5/22/26 10:42 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > On Thu, May 21, 2026 at 3:51 PM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> Sleepable build ID parsing can block in __kernel_read() [1], so the
> >> stackmap sleepable path must not call it while holding mmap_lock or a
> >> per-VMA read lock.
> >>
> >> The issue and the fix are conceptually similar to a recent procfs
> >> patch [2].
> >>
> >> Resolve each covered VMA with a stable read-side reference, preferring
> >> lock_vma_under_rcu() and falling back to mmap_read_trylock() only long
> >> enough to acquire the VMA read lock. Take a reference to the backing
> >> file, drop the VMA lock, and then parse the build ID through
> >> (sleepable) build_id_parse_file().
> >>
> >> We have to use mmap_read_trylock() (and give up on failure) in this
> >> context because taking mmap_read_lock() is generally unsafe on code
> >> paths reachable from BPF programs [3], and may lead to deadlocks.
> >>
> >> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251218005818.614819-1-shakeel.butt@xxxxxxxxx/
> >> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260128183232.2854138-1-andrii@xxxxxxxxxx/
> >> [3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/2895ecd8-df1e-4cc0-b9f9-aef893dc2360@xxxxxxxxx/
> >>
> >> Fixes: d4dd9775ec24 ("bpf: wire up sleepable bpf_get_stack() and bpf_get_task_stack() helpers")
> >> Suggested-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@xxxxxxxxx>
> >> ---
> >> kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >> 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
> >> index 4c753e02c415..95336c0e8b56 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
> >> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
> >> #include <linux/perf_event.h>
> >> #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
> >> #include <linux/buildid.h>
> >> +#include <linux/mmap_lock.h>
> >> #include "percpu_freelist.h"
> >> #include "mmap_unlock_work.h"
> >>
> >> @@ -174,6 +175,107 @@ static inline void stack_map_build_id_set_valid(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id,
> >> memcpy(id->build_id, build_id, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
> >> }
> >>
> >> +struct stack_map_vma_lock {
> >> + bool vma_locked;
> >> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> >> + struct mm_struct *mm;
> >> +};
> >> +
> >> +static struct vm_area_struct *stack_map_lock_vma(struct stack_map_vma_lock *lock, unsigned long ip)
> >> +{
> >> + struct mm_struct *mm = lock->mm;
> >> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> >> +
> >> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!mm))
> >> + return NULL;
> >> +
> >> + vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, ip);
> >> + if (vma)
> >> + goto vma_locked;
> >> +
> >> + /*
> >> + * Taking mmap_read_lock() is unsafe here, because the caller
> >> + * BPF program might already hold it, causing a deadlock.
> >> + */
> >> + if (!mmap_read_trylock(mm))
> >> + return NULL;
> >> +
> >> + vma = vma_lookup(mm, ip);
> >> + if (!vma) {
> >> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> >> + return NULL;
> >> + }
> >
> > As the code is written right now, this vma_lookup is futile if we
> > don't have CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK, no? We'll just unlock mmap and return
> > NULL regardless of this operation succeeding. So if that's the intent,
> > then starting from mmap_read_trylock() all the way to mmap_read_unlock
> > + return NULL should be under #ifdef CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK.
> >
> > But could it be that the intent was to set lock->vma_lock = false,
> > lock->vma=vma + return vma here if vma_lookup under mmap_lock
> > succeeded?...
> >
> > (oh, now scrolling further down the thread, seems like AIs picked up
> > on this as well, oh well)
> >
> >> +
> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK
> >> + if (!vma_start_read_locked(vma)) {
> >> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> >> + return NULL;
> >> + }
> >> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> >> +#else
> >> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> >> + return NULL;
> >
> > see above, was this meant to be a "return vma"?
> >
> > This whole function is quite confusing, please help me understand how
> > it's supposed to work both with and without CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK.
>
> In v2 the stack_map_vma_lock could be holding either vma lock or mmap
> lock, in order to support CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK=n
>
> Then I tried testing it, and it turned out to set CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK=n
> you need to disable SMP, which seems like an unlikely kconfig:
> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/bf91eb90-1b6a-4bad-a0e5-072f9dce7daa@xxxxxxxxx/
>
> So since v3 I dropped attempt to support CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK=n by
> treating it the same way as failed mmap_read_trylock(), which is
> expressed by returning NULL from stack_map_lock_vma().
>
> I guess you have a point in that the stackmap lock/unlock helpers can
> be refactored further. But with respect to CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK=n I
> don't see why we'd want to maintain additional complexity of mmap lock
> bookkeeping.
>

Some architectures do not (yet? ever?) support PER_VMA_LOCK at all.
But even for the common arches it should be possible to turn off
PER_VMA_LOCK:

config PER_VMA_LOCK
def_bool y
depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_PER_VMA_LOCK && MMU && SMP
help
Allow per-vma locking during page fault handling.

This feature allows locking each virtual memory area separately when
handling page faults instead of taking mmap_lock.


We used to not require PER_VMA_LOCK for this functionality, so if it's
not undue complexity and maintenance overhead, I'd try to make it
work.

>
> >
> >> +#endif
> >
> >> +vma_locked:
> >> + lock->vma_locked = true;
> >> + lock->vma = vma;
> >> + return vma;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static void stack_map_unlock_vma(struct stack_map_vma_lock *lock)
> >> +{
> >> + struct vm_area_struct *vma = lock->vma;
> >> +
> >> + if (lock->vma_locked) {
> >> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!vma))
> >> + goto out;
> >
> > this should never ever happen, it's a bug, we shouldn't warn on it, we
> > should make sure we never ever have vma_locked set to true if there is
> > no vma
> >
> > the whole pattern of returning NULL from stack_map_lock_vma() and
> > still holding lock (i.e., allowing and expecting to call
> > stack_map_unlock_vma) seems confusing and error-prone, tbh
>
> The idea of stack_map_lock_vma() was that it may fail like trylock,
> and it is safe to call corresponding unlock(), even if lock isn't
> held. This allows to have an unlock() on all paths after a lock() in
> the code, instead of "if locked" or "if null" checks.
>

I got this, but it's a bit of unusual pattern, so easy to get wrong.
Normally, if some lookup function fails to find whatever needs to be
found, it should release resources (i.e., not keep lock). Sure, it
might require slightly more nuanced error handling in the caller, but
that's nothing new.

> >
> > why not simplify it to "if we got vma and locked it -> we return
> > non-NULL vma and lock is held, otherwise no lock is held (because
> > why?)"
>
> I'll try that.
>
> >
> > pw-bot: cr
> >
> >
> >> + vma_end_read(vma);
> >> + }
> >> +out:
> >> + lock->vma_locked = false;
> >> + lock->vma = NULL;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
> >> + u32 trace_nr)
> >> +{
> >> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> >> + struct stack_map_vma_lock lock = {
> >> + .vma_locked = false,
> >> + .vma = NULL,
> >> + .mm = mm,
> >> + };
> >> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> >> + struct file *file;
> >> + u64 offset;
> >> + u64 ip;
> >> +
> >> + for (u32 i = 0; i < trace_nr; i++) {
> >> + ip = READ_ONCE(id_offs[i].ip);
> >> +
> >> + vma = stack_map_lock_vma(&lock, ip);
> >> + if (!vma || !vma->vm_file) {
> >> + stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
> >> + stack_map_unlock_vma(&lock);
> >
> > see above, I find this confusing to need to call unlock_vma if there
> > is no vma in the first place...
> >
> >> + continue;
> >> + }
> >> +
> >> + file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
> >> + offset = stack_map_build_id_offset(vma->vm_pgoff, vma->vm_start, ip);
> >> + stack_map_unlock_vma(&lock);
> >> +
> >> + /* build_id_parse_file() may block on filesystem reads */
> >> + if (build_id_parse_file(file, id_offs[i].build_id, NULL)) {
> >> + stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
> >> + fput(file);
> >> + continue;
> >> + }
> >> + fput(file);
> >> +
> >> + stack_map_build_id_set_valid(&id_offs[i], offset, id_offs[i].build_id);
> >
> > what about
> >
> > if (build_id_parse_file(...))
> > stack_map_build_id_set_ip(...); /* no build id, parsing failed */
> > else
> > stack_map_build_id_set_valid(...);
> >
> > fput(file);
> >
> > ?
> >
> >> + }
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> /*
> >> * Expects all id_offs[i].ip values to be set to correct initial IPs.
> >> * They will be subsequently:
> >> @@ -194,6 +296,11 @@ static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
> >> const unsigned char *prev_build_id;
> >> int i;
> >>
> >> + if (may_fault && has_user_ctx) {
> >> + stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable(id_offs, trace_nr);
> >> + return;
> >> + }
> >> +
> >> /* If the irq_work is in use, fall back to report ips. Same
> >> * fallback is used for kernel stack (!user) on a stackmap with
> >> * build_id.
> >> --
> >> 2.54.0
> >>
>