Re: [PATCH 0/2] ocfs2/dlm: bound peer-controlled lengths in the o2dlm receive path

[Joseph Qi]

Ocfs2 is always deployed in trusted network, so how to trigger this
issue in real environment?

In a properly administered ocfs2 cluster with trusted nodes and no
compromised machines, this looks essentially unreachable.

IMO, the patches are reasonable as a belt hardening against future bugs
or operational accidents, but not overstate the risk by framing it as a
security vulnerability.

Thanks,
Joseph

On 6/29/26 1:01 PM, Bryam Vargas via B4 Relay wrote:
> The o2dlm receive handlers trust u8 length and count fields from the wire
> without bounding them, so a node in a DLM domain can corrupt or panic any
> other node with a malformed message. Three defects:
> 
>   - dlm_migrate_request_handler() passes migrate->namelen unchecked to
>     dlm_init_mle(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte mname[] of an
>     o2dlm_mle slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~215
>     attacker-controlled bytes.
> 
>   - dlm_mig_lockres_handler() passes mres->lockname_len unchecked to
>     dlm_init_lockres(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte o2dlm_lockname
>     slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~223 bytes.
> 
>   - the same handler trusts mres->num_locks without checking that the
>     message is large enough to hold that many entries, so
>     dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[] past the kmalloc(data_len)
>     copy and trips a BUG_ON (an out-of-bounds read ending in a panic).
> 
> The other o2dlm receive handlers already reject an oversized name; the
> migration and recovery handlers have omitted it since the DLM was added (see
> the Fixes tags). Patch 1 bounds namelen; patch 2 validates lockname_len,
> num_locks, and the payload size. Conforming recovery and migration traffic is
> unaffected.
> 
> o2net authenticates peers only by the DLM domain key, so any node that has
> joined the domain -- including a compromised or malicious member -- can send
> these messages. There is no local trigger; the attacker must already be a
> member of the cluster.
> 
> Each sink was confirmed under KASAN with an out-of-tree module mirroring it
> exactly -- a kmem_cache/kmalloc of the real destination size, then the same
> unclamped memcpy/loop: slab-out-of-bounds Write for the two writes, Read for
> the recovery walk, and a panic. A userspace AddressSanitizer build faults
> identically under -m32 and -m64. Scrubbed logs are available on request.
> 
> I reported this privately to security@xxxxxxxxxx and the ocfs2 maintainers on
> 2026-06-20; with no response after the standard embargo period I am posting
> the fix publicly. I have no embargo requirement.
> 
> Bryam Vargas (2):
>   ocfs2: bound namelen in dlm_migrate_request_handler
>   ocfs2: validate lengths in dlm_mig_lockres_handler
> 
> fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c   | 6 ++++++
>  fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c | 9 +++++++++
>  2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
> 
> ---
> Bryam Vargas (2):
>       ocfs2: bound namelen in dlm_migrate_request_handler
>       ocfs2: validate lengths in dlm_mig_lockres_handler
> 
>  fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c   | 6 ++++++
>  fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c | 9 +++++++++
>  2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
> ---
> base-commit: 4549871118cf616eecdd2d939f78e3b9e1dddc48
> change-id: 20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-0afa227d464c
> 
> Best regards,