Re: [PATCH net v6 1/2] net: validate virtio checksum start after network header

[Michael S. Tsirkin]

On Wed, Sep 23, 2026 at 12:46:42PM +0200, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 23, 2026 at 12:21 PM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Sep 22, 2026 at 09:27:26PM -0400, Willem de Bruijn wrote:
> > > Willem de Bruijn wrote:
> > > > Paulos Yibelo wrote:
> > > > > __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() checks a minimum network-header length for
> > > > > CHECKSUM_PARTIAL packets. Its checksum start is relative to skb->data,
> > > > > but some callers have not established skb->network_header when they
> > > > > convert the virtio header.
> > > > >
> > > > > Pass the data-relative L3 origin explicitly. Ethernet receive paths
> > > > > parse the frame and nested VLAN headers without changing skb state.
> > > > > AF_PACKET uses the frame's actual L3 origin even when the socket
> > > > > protocol is ETH_P_IP and the raw frame carries VLAN tags. Non-Ethernet
> > > > > AF_PACKET devices retain their established skb network offset.
> > > > >
> > > > > Also pass the actual L3 protocol so IPv6 packets use the 40-byte base
> > > > > header minimum even without TCPv6 GSO. IFF_TUN obtains that protocol
> > > > > from the packet before skb->protocol is set. Name the Ethernet parser
> > > > > accordingly, use the same origin for tunnel validation, and propagate
> > > > > conversion failures in UML.
> > > > >
> > > > > The bound remains a minimum; fragmentation paths separately validate
> > > > > the parsed IPv4 or IPv6 header length before completing a checksum.
> > > > >
> > > > > Fixes: 49d14b54a527 ("net: test for not too small csum_start in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()")
> > > > > Fixes: a2fb4bc4e2a6 ("net: implement virtio helpers to handle UDP GSO tunneling.")
> > > > > Reported-by: Paulos Yibelo <habte.yibelo@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260920004733.6473-2-habte.yibelo@xxxxxxxxx/
> > > > > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > > Assisted-by: LLM
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Paulos Yibelo <habte.yibelo@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > ---
> > > > >  arch/um/drivers/vector_transports.c | 13 ++++-
> > > > >  drivers/net/tun_vnet.h              | 52 ++++++++++++++++-
> > > > >  drivers/net/virtio_net.c            | 10 +++-
> > > > >  include/linux/virtio_net.h          | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> > > > >  net/packet/af_packet.c              | 24 +++++++-
> > > > >  5 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > The fix may still miss the case IPv4 packets have options.
> > > >
> > > > This version is a very large patch.
> > > >
> > > > Untested shorter first suggestion by bot, which looks plausible as a
> > > > starting point for discussion.
> > >
> > > Cleaned up some more:
> > >
> > >     diff --git a/drivers/net/tun_vnet.h b/drivers/net/tun_vnet.h
> > >     index f4c652b1fa44..c24607af2aad 100644
> > >     --- a/drivers/net/tun_vnet.h
> > >     +++ b/drivers/net/tun_vnet.h
> > >     @@ -180,6 +180,9 @@ static inline int tun_vnet_hdr_put(int sz, struct iov_iter *iter,
> > >      static inline int tun_vnet_hdr_to_skb(unsigned int flags, struct sk_buff *skb,
> > >                            const struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr)
> > >      {
> > >     +    if ((flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) == IFF_TUN)
> > >     +        skb_reset_network_header(skb);
> > >     +
> > >          return virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(skb, hdr, tun_vnet_is_little_endian(flags));
> > >      }
> > >
> > >     @@ -199,6 +202,9 @@ tun_vnet_hdr_tnl_to_skb(unsigned int flags, netdev_features_t features,
> > >                  struct sk_buff *skb,
> > >                  const struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel *hdr)
> > >      {
> > >     +    if ((flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) == IFF_TUN)
> > >     +        skb_reset_network_header(skb);
> > >     +
> > >
> > >     diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h
> > >     index c381b916c1b5..02c448de0802 100644
> > >     --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h
> > >     +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h
> > >     @@ -48,6 +48,42 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(struct sk_buff *skb,
> > >          return 0;
> > >      }
> > >
> > >     +static inline int virtio_net_hdr_nh_min_len(const struct sk_buff *skb,
> > >     +                        unsigned int nh_min_len)
> > >     +{
> > >     +    int thoff = skb_transport_offset(skb);
> > >     +    __be16 proto;
> > >     +    int nhoff;
> > >     +
> > >     +    if (skb_network_header_was_set(skb)) {
> > >     +        nhoff = skb_network_offset(skb);
> > >     +        proto = skb->protocol;
> > >     +    } else {
> > >     +        if (unlikely(thoff < ETH_HLEN))
> > >     +            return -EINVAL;
> > >     +        nhoff = ETH_HLEN;
> > >     +        proto = eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto;
> > >     +    }
> > >     +
> > >     +    if (eth_type_vlan(proto)) {
> > >     +        proto = __vlan_get_protocol(skb, proto, &nhoff);
> > >     +        if (!proto)
> > >     +            return -EINVAL;
> > >     +    }
> > >     +
> > >     +    if (proto == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
> > >     +        const struct iphdr *iph = (void *)(skb->data + nhoff);
> > >     +
> > >     +        if (unlikely(thoff < nhoff + sizeof(*iph)))
> > >     +            return -EINVAL;
> > >     +        nh_min_len = max_t(u32, iph->ihl * 4, sizeof(*iph));
> > >     +    } else if (proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
> > >     +        nh_min_len = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
> > >     +    }
> > >     +
> > >     +    return nhoff + nh_min_len;
> > >     +}
> > >     +
> > >      static inline int __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
> > >                            const struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr,
> > >                            bool little_endian, u8 hdr_gso_type)
> > >     @@ -98,13 +134,15 @@ static inline int __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
> > >              u32 start = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->csum_start);
> > >              u32 off = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->csum_offset);
> > >              u32 needed = start + max_t(u32, thlen, off + sizeof(__sum16));
> > >     +        int min_thoff;
> > >
> > >              if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, needed))
> > >                  return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > >              if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, start, off))
> > >                  return -EINVAL;
> > >     -        if (skb_transport_offset(skb) < nh_min_len)
> > >     +        min_thoff = virtio_net_hdr_nh_min_len(skb, nh_min_len);
> > >     +        if (min_thoff < 0 || skb_transport_offset(skb) < min_thoff)
> > >                  return -EINVAL;
> >
> >
> > Certainly looks much better. But I'd like to ask, generally:
> > doesn't the net stack need to protect against weird packets?
> >
> 
> It does, but csum_start/csum_offset are not "weird packet" material,
> they are skb metadata, not bytes on the wire.
> 
> For essentially every skb in the kernel, this metadata is produced by
> the kernel itself,
> from headers it has just built or just parsed, and the rest of the
> stack (GSO, skb_checksum_help(),
> fragmentation, netfilter, and every driver doing TX csum offload)
> consumes it as an invariant.
> The only producers of attacker/guest controlled CHECKSUM_PARTIAL metadata are
> the virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() callers: af_packet, tun/tap, virtio_net,
> and the UML vector driver.
> 
> So this is not "virtio specific validation", this is input validation
> at the one trust boundary
> where the invariant can be violated.


Thanks for the explanation Eric!

> 
> > It seems likely that not all drivers validate headers defensively,
> > and incoming packets can easily become outgoing ones.
> 
> Packets coming from a real NIC are CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY,
> CHECKSUM_COMPLETE or CHECKSUM_NONE.
> They do not carry a remote-provided csum_start.
> (Remote checksum offload is the rare exception, and there the offsets
> are computed by the stack from headers it just parsed.)
> 
> Incoming packets becoming outgoing ones is precisely the problem here:
> a virtio_net RX skb with VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM becomes
> an skb that can be bridged/forwarded/fragmented and then handed to a real NIC.

Well:

$ git grep 'skb->csum_start\ ='
drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_enet.c:        skb->csum_start = (unsigned char *)th - skb->head;
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c:        skb->csum_start = (unsigned char *)uh - skb->head;
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c:        skb->csum_start = (unsigned char *)uh - skb->head;
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c:        skb->csum_start = (unsigned char *)tcp - skb->head;
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c:        skb->csum_start = (unsigned char *)tcp - skb->head;
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_selftests.c:         skb->csum_start = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb->head;

What did I miss?

> 
> > So do we even need virtio specific validation, or is it enough to
> > validate everything in the net stack, where we are poking at the
> > header anyway?
> 
> The core stack cannot afford it.
> 
> 1) Drivers program skb->csum_start / skb->csum_offset straight into
> the TX descriptor, and the NIC will happily write two bytes wherever
> it was told, e.g. into the IP header of the frame we put on the wire.
> Auditing/adding checks in every driver is not realistic, and drivers
> must not pay for it.
> 
> 2) Catching this in the core would mean re-parsing L2/L3 in
> dev_hard_start_xmit()
> (or in every place that eventually looks at the transport header) for
> the 99.99+%
> of packets that were built by the stack and are known to be consistent.
> That is far more expensive than one check at injection time.
> 
> 3) Failing at injection returns -EINVAL to the sendmsg()/writev() caller,
> which is the correct and testable behavior. Failing later means dropping
> the packet deep in the xmit path, usually with a splat: the commit being fixed
> here (49d14b54a527) exists exactly because such a packet reached
> skb_checksum_help() from ip_do_fragment() and hit the "offset (-6) >=
> skb_headlen() (14)" WARN.
> 
> >
> > Or maybe it's more a defense in depth thing?
> >
> > My worries:
> > - more poking at the header, more cache misses, where we really
> >   do not need that
> 
> I do not expect anything measurable.
> 
> af_packet and tun: we have just copied that header from user space, it is in L1.
> virtio_net: we call eth_type_trans() right after, and GRO parses L3/L4
> immediately.
> 
> The whole block is under the CHECKSUM_PARTIAL condition, where we already
> do pskb_may_pull() and skb_partial_csum_set(), i.e. we already touch
> this cache line.
> Reading iph->ihl from a cache line we are about to read anyway is noise.
> 
> > - future protocol extensions that now will require surgery in
> >   virtio, instead of just being passed through to the host
> 
> Fair, and this is an argument about how the check is written, not
> about whether it exists.
> The rule should be:
> 
> Only tighten the bound for the protocols we already parse (IPv4/IPv6),
> and keep the existing generic minimum for anything else.
> 
> Then an unknown ethertype simply keeps flowing, no surgery is needed.
> Willem's version does that. A new protocol would only be impacted if it wanted
> csum_start to point inside what we consider the L3 header, and such a packet
> would not survive the rest of the stack anyway.
> 
> So: not defense in depth, but validation at the trust boundary, where
> it is cheapest
> and where we can still report the error to the producer.
> 
> >
> > What do others think?
> >
> > --
> > MST
> >