Re: [PATCH bpf-next 4/8] bpf, lsm: Let BPF LSM provide xattrs at inode creation

[Justin Suess]

On Wed, Sep 23, 2026 at 03:14:28PM -0400, David Windsor wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 23, 2026 at 12:57 PM Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > @David, simply for my own understanding, did you ask Daniel to do
> > this, or was Daniel operating on his own with this patchset?
> >
> 
> Daniel and I work together and both have things written on top of this
> kfunc. He reached out to collaborate, I agreed. We're also going to
> send bpf_set_file_xattr shortly.
> 
> This implementation was chosen due to its immediate mergeability (it
> only touches security/bpf), but was actually suggested by Kumar in v1
> or so of my original series.
> 
> That said, sorry for any confusion about this appearing as a new
> series rather than as v7 of my previous one.
>
Howdy all,

Hope you all are doing well and having a good Thursday.

These patches are excellent and useful, and have been in the pipeline
for a while. 

In the interest of moving forward:

Would you both be able to live with the following: provide a security hook
for lsm_get_xattr_slot or another proper interface with the necessary
abstraction, and keep the kfunc where it is in fs/?

This addresses the primary concern about calling into LSM internals by
providing a blessed interface. I'd be happy to detail what I had in mind.

I think the end users care extremely little about what directory the
source code ends up in. They care about: getting useful features.

We all work in the same kernel and it's easier to walk when both legs
are going in the same direction. I think that this hill would be an
unfitting, uninteresting place for these useful patches to die on :) 

Let me know if this is something you both could stomach.

Sincerely,
Justin