Re: [PATCH net 1/2] wireguard: account peer and allowedips allocations to memcg
From: alex
Date: Tue Nov 10 2026 - 13:20:05 EST
Yes, it is the documented expectation for long-lived objects whose
allocation userspace can trigger. Documentation/core-api/memory-allocation.rst
says:
Untrusted allocations triggered from userspace should be a subject
of kmem accounting and must have __GFP_ACCOUNT bit set.
Most hardware drivers don't need it because their allocations are sized
by the hardware, not by userspace. Virtual devices configured over
netlink from inside a user namespace are a different case, and the core
stack has been converted for that reason. For example:
6126891c6d4f ("memcg: enable accounting for IP address and routing-related objects")
c948f51c1654 ("memcg: enable accounting for net_device and Tx/Rx queues")
a89893dd7b08 ("memcg: enable accounting for VLAN group array")
961c6136359e ("net: enable memcg accounting for veth queues")
33758c891479 ("memcg: enable accounting for nft objects")
and more recently:
1beb81947eb4 ("net/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg")
b0057c68df71 ("xsk: account ring allocations to memcg")
The fib_trie, ip6_fib and ip6 dst caches are created with SLAB_ACCOUNT,
and the netdev queues and VLAN array use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT. The first
commit describes the same situation as here: a netadmin inside a
container adds many addresses/routes and makes the kernel allocate
unaccounted long-lived memory. WireGuard peers and allowed IPs are the
same kind of object, so they should be charged to the same memcg.
There is no functional change unless a memcg limit is set. Then the
configuring process gets -ENOMEM (or the memcg OOM killer runs) instead
of the allocations silently going past the limit.
Thanks,
Alexander
-------- Исходное сообщение --------
Тема: Re: [PATCH net 1/2] wireguard: account peer and allowedips allocations to memcg
Дата: 10.11.2026 16:57
От: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
Кому: Alexander Ildiyarov <alex@xxxxxxxxxx>
On Thu, Nov 05, 2026 at 05:10:05PM +0300, Alexander Ildiyarov wrote:
Peers, allowed IP trie nodes, the per-peer dst_cache and the per-device
hashtables are all allocated in the context of the process that
configures the device over netlink, but none of these allocations are
charged to that process's memory cgroup: the wg_peer and allowedips_node
caches are created without SLAB_ACCOUNT, and the hashtables and
dst_cache use plain GFP_KERNEL.
The amount of memory is bounded only by MAX_PEERS_PER_DEVICE (2^20) per
device, with no limit on the number of devices or on the number of
allowed IPs per peer. Since WG_CMD_SET_DEVICE uses GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM,
any user who can create a user and network namespace can do this, and
thereby escape the memory limits of the cgroup it runs in.
For example, a process in a cgroup with memory.max=64M that adds 100000
peers with 20 /128 allowed IPs each grows Slab by ~790 MiB, yet the
cgroup's memory.current stays below 1 MiB and its memory limit is never
hit.
Fix this by creating the two caches with SLAB_ACCOUNT and using
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for the hashtables and the dst_cache. The keypair
allocations are left alone, as they happen from the handshake worker and
are bounded to three per peer.
I wasn't aware of this trick, I think mostly because most drivers don't
use this. Does any other part of the networking stack do this? Is this a
normal thing?