[PATCH v3 08/11] KVM: arm64: CCA: Prevent memslot modifications after Realm creation
From: Steven Price
Date: Mon Nov 16 2026 - 11:45:09 EST
From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@xxxxxxx>
Once the Realm is created, prevent changes to guest_memfd backed
memslots, which can provide private memory. Validate these changes
before KVM invalidates the old memslot, so a rejected deletion leaves
its stage-2 mappings intact. Realm stage-2 faults will also validate
the private memory backing in a later commit.
Require Realm memslots to lie in the lower half of the IPA space, as the
upper, shared half aliases the lower, protected half.
Define kvm_arch_has_private_mem() so generic KVM recognizes Realm VMs
as supporting private memory.
Additionally, similar to pKVM, do not support dirty logging or
read-only memslots.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@xxxxxxx>
---
Changes since v1:
- Preserve private mappings if KVM invalidates a Realm guest_memfd
slot before the prepare hook rejects its deletion.
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index aaac97a7461c..2c8cd9a1dd52 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1611,6 +1611,8 @@ struct kvm *kvm_arch_alloc_vm(void);
#define kvm_vm_hyp_is_distrusting(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.vm_flavor >= __VM_DISTRUSTING_HYP)
+#define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm)
+
#define kvm_has_mte(kvm) \
(system_supports_mte() && \
test_bit(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_MTE_ENABLED, &(kvm)->arch.flags))
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
index 759ac0453828..0db3c293fdd5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -2858,17 +2858,32 @@ int kvm_arch_validate_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
{
lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
- if (kvm_vm_is_protected(kvm)) {
+ if (kvm_vm_is_protected(kvm) && new &&
+ (new->flags & (KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES | KVM_MEM_READONLY)))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ switch (kvm->arch.vm_flavor) {
+ case VM_PROTECTED_PKVM:
/* Cannot modify memslots once a pVM has run. */
if (pkvm_hyp_vm_is_created(kvm) &&
- (change == KVM_MR_DELETE || change == KVM_MR_MOVE)) {
+ (change == KVM_MR_DELETE || change == KVM_MR_MOVE))
return -EPERM;
- }
+ break;
+ case VM_REALM:
+ /*
+ * Once the Realm is created, we cannot modify any slots that
+ * could be providing private memory. i.e., guest_memfd backed
+ * slots.
+ * TODO: Handle trusted device private memory slots
+ */
+ if (!kvm_realm_is_created(kvm))
+ break;
- if (new &&
- new->flags & (KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES | KVM_MEM_READONLY)) {
+ if (kvm_slot_has_gmem(old) || kvm_slot_has_gmem(new))
return -EPERM;
- }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
}
return 0;
@@ -2880,6 +2895,7 @@ int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
enum kvm_mr_change change)
{
hva_t hva, reg_end;
+ gfn_t ipa_limit;
int ret = 0;
if (change != KVM_MR_CREATE && change != KVM_MR_MOVE &&
@@ -2887,10 +2903,13 @@ int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
return 0;
/*
- * Prevent userspace from creating a memory region outside of the IPA
- * space addressable by the KVM guest IPA space.
+ * Realm shared IPAs alias the corresponding private IPAs, so memslots
+ * must reside entirely in the canonical lower half of the IPA space.
*/
- if ((new->base_gfn + new->npages) > (kvm_phys_size(&kvm->arch.mmu) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
+ ipa_limit = kvm_phys_size(&kvm->arch.mmu) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm))
+ ipa_limit >>= 1;
+ if (new->base_gfn + new->npages > ipa_limit)
return -EFAULT;
/*
--
2.43.0