Re: [PATCH net v2] xfrm: do not write the ethernet header when the mac header is unset

From: Piyus Kedia

Date: Tue Nov 17 2026 - 09:41:09 EST


Hi Eric,

Thanks for the suggestion! We have submitted a new patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261117143612.95112-1-piyus@xxxxxxxxxxx/

We also tested it on our platform and the KASAN bugs are gone after this patch.

Thanks and regards,
Piyus Kedia
Kapil Vaswani

On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 1:43 PM Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Le mar. 17 nov. 2026 à 07:21, Piyus Kedia <piyus@xxxxxxxxxxx> a écrit :
> >
> > xfrm4_remove_tunnel_encap() and xfrm6_remove_tunnel_encap() restore the
> > mac header after removing the tunnel header and then stamp the protocol
> > into it:
> >
> > skb_reset_network_header(skb);
> > skb_mac_header_rebuild(skb);
> > if (skb->mac_len)
> > eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto = skb->protocol;
> >
> > skb_mac_header_rebuild() does nothing at all when the mac header was
> > never set:
> >
> > static inline void skb_mac_header_rebuild(struct sk_buff *skb)
> > {
> > if (skb_mac_header_was_set(skb)) {
> > ...
> > }
> > }
> >
> > and it does not clear skb->mac_len either, so on an skb whose mac header
> > has been unset while mac_len stayed behind, the guard is true and the
> > store goes through an unset header. skb_mac_header() is
> > skb->head + skb->mac_header and the unset value of that u16 is 0xffff,
> > so eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto is 65535 + offsetof(struct ethhdr, h_proto)
> > bytes past skb->head: a two-byte out-of-bounds write landing far outside
> > the skb, in whatever object happens to be there.
> >
> > skb_unset_mac_header() leaves skb->mac_len alone, and of its callers only
> > skb_carve_reset_headers() clears mac_len by hand. end_dt_vrf_rcv()
> > (SRv6 End.DT4/End.DT6) unsets the mac header on the receive path so the
> > VRF device can rebuild it, and leaves mac_len at the value the original
> > ethernet frame had, which is how an skb in this state reaches xfrm input:
> >
> > tun_get_user -> netif_receive_skb -> lwtunnel_input
> > -> seg6_local_input_core -> End.DT4 -> end_dt_vrf_rcv
> > -> skb_unset_mac_header (mac_len stays 14)
> > -> VRF l3_rcv -> ip_local_deliver_finish -> xfrm4_esp_rcv
> > -> xfrm_input -> xfrm4_remove_tunnel_encap
> >
> > BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfrm4_remove_tunnel_encap+0x17d/0x220
> > net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:258
> > Write of size 2 at addr ffff88805f85800b by task syz-executor/10831
> > ...
> > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88805f858000
> > which belongs to the cache zswap_entry of size 56
> >
> > The address does not depend on mac_len - it is always
> > skb->head + 0xffff + offsetof(struct ethhdr, h_proto), since the unset
> > sentinel is what mac_header holds - and mac_len only decides whether the
> > write happens. The value is skb->protocol. It is two bytes at a fixed
> > 64KB offset, crossing into an unrelated slab cache.
> >
> > A THIRD SITE HAS THE SAME THREE LINES, in __input_process_payload()
> > (net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c), reached when an IPTFS payload is decapsulated:
> >
> > skb->protocol = protocol;
> > skb_mac_header_rebuild(skb);
> > if (skb->mac_len)
> > eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto = skb->protocol;
> >
> > and it has its own KASAN report, a use-after-free rather than an
> > out-of-bounds, for the reason given below.
> >
> > That function already knows the test is needed. Its other mac-header path
> > is guarded by old_mac, which it computes at the top as
> >
> > old_mac = skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) ? skb_mac_header(skb) : NULL;
> >
> > and only rebuilds the header when that is non-NULL. The site above omits
> > the same check.
> >
> > WHY THE THREE REPORTS CARRY DIFFERENT TITLES, which is worth stating so
> > they are not read as three defects. The address written is a fixed
> > skb->head + 0xffff + offsetof(struct ethhdr, h_proto), so what it lands in
> > is whatever the allocator placed 16 pages past the skb: a live object gives
> > slab-out-of-bounds, a freed one or a page back on the buddy free list gives
> > use-after-free, and a different LIVE object gives nothing at all, since
> > generic KASAN only tests whether the target address is poisoned. Across
> > six boots of one reproducer the write executed in five and KASAN reported
> > it in one. On a kernel without KASAN it is always silent.
> >
> > Only write the ethernet header when there is one. This mirrors what
> > xfrm4_transport_input() already does, where the header length is taken as
> > skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) ? skb_mac_header_len(skb) : 0, and what
> > __input_process_payload() already does for old_mac, and it leaves the
> > behaviour of every well-formed skb unchanged.
> >
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261116174531.2540348-2-piyus@xxxxxxxxxxx
> > Signed-off-by: Kapil Vaswani <kapil@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Piyus Kedia <piyus@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >
> > v2:
> > - guard the third site, net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c in __input_process_payload().
> > It has the same three lines and its own KASAN report, a use-after-free,
> > and v1 left it alone - which would have closed two write sites of the
> > three while leaving a confirmed one live.
> > - say why the three reports carry different titles (slab-out-of-bounds,
> > use-after-free, use-after-free): the address is fixed relative to
> > skb->head, so the verdict is decided by whatever the allocator put 16
> > pages later, and a live neighbour gives no report at all.
> > - cite __input_process_payload()'s own old_mac computation as the in-tree
> > precedent alongside xfrm4_transport_input()'s.
> >
> > No change to the two hunks v1 carried.
> >
> > Tested at runtime on mainline before and after: both kernels built from
> > aebb72744764 ("Linux 7.4-rc3") in one scripted run, x86_64 with
> > CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC, CONFIG_DEBUG_NET, CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_LWTUNNEL and
> > CONFIG_NET_VRF. Six boots each, injecting after the uptime passed 130s. The
> > skb_reset_mac_len() warnings at include/linux/skbuff.h:2995 are the control:
> > they fire when the unset-header skb reaches the receive path and this patch
> > does not touch that site.
> >
> > skb came through reached the write KASAN
> > unpatched 5 of 6 boots 5 of 5 1
> > patched 2 of 6 boots 0 of 2 0
> >
> > Every unpatched boot in which the skb arrived reached the write; no patched
> > boot did, including the two in which the control shows the same skb arriving.
> > The one-in-five KASAN rate is the point made in the changelog about the
> > verdict depending on the neighbour.
> >
> > checkpatch reports one thing, the missing Fixes: tag. Neither tree we
> > reproduced on carries history for these files, so we could not determine the
> > introducing commit; we will add it if you can name it.
> >
> > net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 4 ++--
> > net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c | 2 +-
> > 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
> > index 5ed87d513..624ff8055 100644
> > --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
> > +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
> > @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static int xfrm4_remove_tunnel_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
> >
> > skb_reset_network_header(skb);
> > skb_mac_header_rebuild(skb);
> > - if (skb->mac_len)
> > + if (skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) && skb->mac_len)
> > eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto = skb->protocol;
> >
> > err = 0;
> > @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static int xfrm6_remove_tunnel_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
> >
> > skb_reset_network_header(skb);
> > skb_mac_header_rebuild(skb);
> > - if (skb->mac_len)
> > + if (skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) && skb->mac_len)
> > eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto = skb->protocol;
> >
> > err = 0;
> > diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
> > index 0313a43aa..41af72a92 100644
> > --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
> > +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
> > @@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ static bool __input_process_payload(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 data,
> >
> > skb->protocol = protocol;
> > skb_mac_header_rebuild(skb);
> > - if (skb->mac_len)
> > + if (skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) && skb->mac_len)
> > eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto = skb->protocol;
> >
> > /* all pointers could be changed now reset walk */
> > --
> > 2.34.1
>
> I think you are fixing the wrong layer.
>
> I would have used something more generic.
>
> net: clear skb->mac_len in skb_unset_mac_header()
>
> skb_unset_mac_header() marks the mac header as unset but leaves
> skb->mac_len alone, so an skb can end up with no mac header and a
> non-zero mac_len. Code that uses mac_len to decide whether a mac
> header is present is then misled.
>
> end_dt_vrf_rcv() (SRv6 End.DT4/End.DT6) unsets the mac header of the
> decapsulated packet so that the VRF device can rebuild it. The VRF
> device only does so when a packet sniffer is attached, so without one
> the skb continues up the stack with mac_len == 14. In
> xfrm4_remove_tunnel_encap() and xfrm6_remove_tunnel_encap(),
> skb_mac_header_rebuild() is a no-op for such an skb, and the following
>
> if (skb->mac_len)
> eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto = skb->protocol;
>
> writes two bytes at skb->head + 0xffff + offsetof(struct ethhdr, h_proto):
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfrm4_remove_tunnel_encap+0x17d/0x220
> Write of size 2 at addr ffff88805f85800b by task syz-executor/10831
> xfrm4_remove_tunnel_encap
> xfrm_input
> xfrm4_esp_rcv
> ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
> ip_local_deliver_finish
> seg6_local_input_core
> lwtunnel_input
> __netif_receive_skb
> netif_receive_skb
> tun_rx_batched
> tun_get_user
>
> Clear mac_len in skb_unset_mac_header() so that all callers leave the
> skb in a consistent state, and remove the now redundant assignment in
> skb_carve_reset_headers(). The other callers are on egress paths
> (__bpf_redirect_neigh(), bpf_lwt_push_ip_encap()) or only reach the
> helper when the mac header was already unset (bpf_update_srh_state()),
> and do not read mac_len afterwards.
>
> The issue was reported on the list by Piyus Kedia and Kapil Vaswani,
> who found it by fuzzing with AI assistance and reproduced the KASAN
> splat on v7.4-rc3. Their reproducer was not published, so this patch
> is build tested only.
>
> Fixes: 664d6f86868b ("seg6: add support for the SRv6 End.DT4 behavior")
> Reported-by: Piyus Kedia <piyus@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Reported-by: Kapil Vaswani <kapil@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261116174531.2540348-2-piyus@xxxxxxxxxxx/
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
> index 6787fcf6ac3e43fe87fa5f9007b6d99f7aea0b44..9cd8eff0309cc3a646dc49e83a0cea79512cf8f5
> 100644
> --- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
> +++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
> @@ -3186,6 +3186,7 @@ static inline u32 skb_mac_header_len(const
> struct sk_buff *skb)
> static inline void skb_unset_mac_header(struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> skb->mac_header = (typeof(skb->mac_header))~0U;
> + skb->mac_len = 0;
> }
>
> static inline void skb_reset_mac_header(struct sk_buff *skb)
> diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
> index 1ac1e327ac4c6258726efaba346297ccbec7eef4..8fe0938d6131031a33b535fdf60d9eec50041ea4
> 100644
> --- a/net/core/skbuff.c
> +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
> @@ -6984,7 +6984,6 @@ static void skb_carve_reset_headers(struct sk_buff *skb)
> skb_unset_mac_header(skb);
> skb_unset_transport_header(skb);
> skb_reset_network_header(skb);
> - skb->mac_len = 0;
>
> /* Inner offsets have no "unset" marker, zero them so that
> * skb_inner_network_header_was_set() becomes false and no