Re: [PATCH] userns: security: Inform LSMs of capability check during userns creation

From: Bradley Morgan

Date: Tue Nov 17 2026 - 11:31:05 EST


On 17 November 2026 15:15:30 GMT, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
>On Sat, Nov 14, 2026 at 02:44:24PM +0000, Bradley Morgan wrote:
>> On 14 November 2026 14:34:07 GMT, Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> >Nov 13, 2026 15:54:37 Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@xxxxxxxxx>:
>> >
>> >> On 13 November 2026 21:39:33 GMT, "Serge E. Hallyn"
><serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> wrote:
>> >>> On Wed, Nov 11, 2026 at 08:58:14PM +0000, Bradley Morgan wrote:
>> >>>> Right now security_capable() gets called in create_user_ns() to
>> >snapshot
>> >>>> whether the parent could setfcap, but the LSM gets zero context on
>> >where
>> >>>> the check actually came from. It is the same story as setid:
>without a
>> >>>> dedicated flag, security modules cannot tell this apart from
>regular
>> >>>> capability checks.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Add CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE and pass it along from create_user_ns().
>> >>>
>> >>> This should be patch 1/N in a set that introduces a user of it
>> >>> in some lsm.
>> >>
>> >> hmm. Did you read Christians suggestion?
>> >
>> >I did, when he first sent it. Actually it seems to me that what the lsm
>> >would really like to know is that this is not for an immediate use of
>> >setfcap, but possible future use. But that doesn't really matter. I
>wasn't
>> >judging the patch. I was just going by what i believe is general lsm
>> >subsystem policy.
>>
>> ( my word wrapping client did not like that message :( )
>
>Hm. yeah. (Do you mean word-wrapping or non-word-wrapping?) I see my
>phone mailer made it all one line. I'll see if there's a setting for
>that.

like I had to scroll right in order to read all of your text.

>
>> hmm, it's pre-reqed over the patch as on the lore link, so Christian may
>> want to have a look at this obe
>
>Did this line get cut off?

s/obe/one , typo.


>
>> >> Let's see if Christian or anyone
>> >> else could suggest a nice little lsm user for this.
>>
>> >> If nobody responds, in coming days, I'll go and find and do a user
>for
>> >it.
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>>> Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> >>>> Link:
>> >>>
>>
>>https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-kommt-gischt-ohnedies-469998d2f219@brauner/
>> >>>> Signed-off-by: Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@xxxxxxxxx>
>> >>>> ---
>> >>>> Thanks Christian for the suggestion :).
>> >>>> ---
>> >>>> include/linux/security.h | 2 ++
>> >>>> kernel/user_namespace.c  | 3 ++-
>> >>>> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> >>>>
>> >>>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> >>>> index 40831fab54709..d24666a0b4833 100644
>> >>>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> >>>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> >>>> @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ struct nsset;
>> >>>> #define CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT BIT(1)
>> >>>> /* If capable is being called by a setid function */
>> >>>> #define CAP_OPT_INSETID BIT(2)
>> >>>> +/* Is capable being called from the user namespace creation path?
>*/
>> >>>> +#define CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE BIT(3)
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /* LSM Agnostic defines for security_sb_set_mnt_opts() flags */
>> >>>> #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1
>> >>>> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> >>>> index 57b7f10be74e1..37480f6d8369f 100644
>> >>>> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> >>>> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> >>>> @@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
>> >>>>      * audit: the creator may never map uid 0.
>> >>>>      */
>> >>>>     ns->parent_could_setfcap =
>> >>>> -       !security_capable(new, parent_ns, CAP_SETFCAP,
>> >CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
>> >>>> +       !security_capable(new, parent_ns, CAP_SETFCAP,
>> >>>> +                 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT | CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE);
>> >>>>
>> >>>>     ret = ns_common_init(ns);
>> >>>>     if (ret)
>> >>>> --
>> >>>> 2.53.0
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >> --- Thanks!
>> >
>> >
>>
>> --- Thanks!
>

--- Thanks!