Re: [PATCH] userns: security: Inform LSMs of capability check during userns creation

From: Bradley Morgan

Date: Tue Nov 17 2026 - 11:37:00 EST


On 17 November 2026 16:31:16 GMT, Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
>On Sat, Nov 14, 2026 at 08:34:07AM -0600, Serge Hallyn wrote:
>> Nov 13, 2026 15:54:37 Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@xxxxxxxxx>:
>>
>> > On 13 November 2026 21:39:33 GMT, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> > wrote:
>> >> On Wed, Nov 11, 2026 at 08:58:14PM +0000, Bradley Morgan wrote:
>> >>> Right now security_capable() gets called in create_user_ns() to
>snapshot
>> >>> whether the parent could setfcap, but the LSM gets zero context on
>where
>> >>> the check actually came from. It is the same story as setid: without
>a
>> >>> dedicated flag, security modules cannot tell this apart from regular
>> >>> capability checks.
>> >>>
>> >>> Add CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE and pass it along from create_user_ns().
>> >>
>> >> This should be patch 1/N in a set that introduces a user of it
>> >> in some lsm.
>> >
>> > hmm. Did you read Christians suggestion?
>>
>> I did, when he first sent it. Actually it seems to me that what the
>> lsm would really like to know is that this is not for an immediate use
>> of setfcap, but possible future use. But that doesn't really matter. I
>> wasn't judging the patch. I was just going by what i believe is
>> general lsm subsystem policy.
>
>My main point is this: right now security_capable() doesn't actually
>specify what specific action it denies. I think we would be much better
>served if we had an enum that would allow us to annotate places where it
>matters what specific action is checked. I would make use of this in bpf
>lsms.

Does this patch look okay to you? Would you like any improvements? (Except
from adding a user) :)

>

--- Thanks!