Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] security: Add PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK for process-wide bounding-set drops
From: Andrew G. Morgan
Date: Tue Nov 17 2026 - 15:32:40 EST
LGTM but reflecting on the likely lack of further expansion for that
new argument, I would have likely gone with different
prctl(PR_CAPBSET_*,...) values for the two scopes of operation.
Cheers
Andrew
On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 10:39 PM Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>
> 在 2026/11/9 22:59, Serge E. Hallyn 写道:
> > Hi Jinjie,
> >
> > how do you feel about adding something like a thread | process flag?
>
> Hi Serge, Andrew,
>
> Sorry for replying so late.
>
> I think this sounds good for me, similar to seccomp's
> SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC: by default only the calling thread's bounding
> set is trimmed (so a later fork() inherits it while the rest of the
> process is untouched), and PR_CAPBSET_DROP_PROCESS applies it to the
> whole thread group.
>
> Is it similar to the following code?
>
>
> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK <n>
> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP_THREAD 0
> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP_PROCESS 1
>
> User space use as below:
>
> prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK, lo, hi, PR_CAPBSET_DROP_THREAD, 0);
> prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK, lo, hi, PR_CAPBSET_DROP_PROCESS, 0);
>
> # cap_task_prctl()
> case PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK:
> switch (arg4) {
> case PR_CAPBSET_DROP_THREAD:
> return cap_prctl_drop_mask(arg2, arg3, false);
>
> case PR_CAPBSET_DROP_PROCESS:
> return cap_prctl_drop_mask(arg2, arg3, true);
>
> default:
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> static int cap_bset_drop_thread(kernel_cap_t mask)
> {
> struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
>
> if (!new)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> new->cap_bset = cap_drop(new->cap_bset, mask);
> return commit_creds(new);
> }
>
> Best regards,
> Jinjie
>
> >
> > On Wed, Oct 21, 2026 at 07:42:43AM -0700, Andrew G. Morgan wrote:
> >> There are a number of situations where existing code wants to
> >> (temporarily) affect the capabilities of a single thread, so a
> >> subsequent fork() starts with those without affecting the parent
> >> process as a whole. I've been wondering if this code could be
> >> structured to allow an argument of the prctl() to indicate if the call
> >> is "whole process" or "just this thread" scoped?
> >>
> >> Cheers
> >>
> >> Andrew
> >>
> >> On Wed, Oct 21, 2026 at 7:36 AM Serge E. Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Tue, Sep 29, 2026 at 09:01:59PM +0800, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
> >>>> PR_CAPBSET_DROP only affects the calling thread. Process-wide capability
> >>>> dropping requires user space to loop over every thread and every
> >>>> capability, which is highly expensive. For instance, long-lived
> >>>> multi-threaded processes (like gVisor's sentry) spend milliseconds
> >>>> trimming the bounding set because the runtime has to coordinate
> >>>> and signal every thread.
> >>>>
> >>>> Add PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK, an opt-in prctl that removes a set of
> >>>> capabilities from the entire thread group's bounding set in a single call.
> >>>> The capabilities are specified via a 64-bit mask across arg2 (low 32 bits)
> >>>> and arg3 (high 32 bits).
> >>>>
> >>>> The drop is recorded in a per-thread-group mask,
> >>>> signal_struct::cap_bset_pending, under sighand->siglock. This pending drop
> >>>> is dynamically folded into the bounding set in critical paths:
> >>>> cap_capset(), PR_CAPBSET_READ(), and cap_bprm_creds_from_file().
> >>>> Running, concurrently created, or future threads within the group will
> >>>> all immediately observe the drop. A forked child inherits this mask
> >>>> in cap_bset_drop_fork() under siglock to close the race window
> >>>> against clone().
> >>>>
> >>>> The operation is drop-only, so concurrent callers commute and a single
> >>>> atomic OR is the linearization point. It performs no per-thread allocation
> >>>> and only the caller's replacement cred can fail, reported synchronously as
> >>>> -ENOMEM before anything changes.
> >>>>
> >>>> In an arm64 KVM guest, trimming 41 capabilities of a multi-threaded Go
> >>>> process takes ~8.5-23.6ms with the per-thread PR_CAPBSET_DROP loop and
> >>>> ~11-14us with PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK, independent of the thread count.
> >>>>
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >>>
> >>> Interesting idea, storing it in the sighand.
> >>>
> >>> Oleg, do you see any issues with that part of this?
> >>>
> >>> Overall, this seems ok to me. That is, I think it addresses all the
> >>> concerns I had with the previous version.
> >>>
> >>>> ---
> >>>> fs/proc/array.c | 3 +-
> >>>> include/linux/capability.h | 5 ++
> >>>> include/linux/sched/signal.h | 8 ++++
> >>>> include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 +
> >>>> kernel/fork.c | 1 +
> >>>> security/commoncap.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> >>>> 6 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >>>>
> >>>> diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
> >>>> index f6f75d206762..f1cde26d079c 100644
> >>>> --- a/fs/proc/array.c
> >>>> +++ b/fs/proc/array.c
> >>>> @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
> >>>> #include <linux/tty.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/string.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/mman.h>
> >>>> +#include <linux/capability.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
> >>>> @@ -318,7 +319,7 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
> >>>> cap_inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
> >>>> cap_permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
> >>>> cap_effective = cred->cap_effective;
> >>>> - cap_bset = cred->cap_bset;
> >>>> + cap_bset = cap_bset_effective(p, cred);
> >>>> cap_ambient = cred->cap_ambient;
> >>>> rcu_read_unlock();
> >>>>
> >>>> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> >>>> index 7921a0b3b04a..6413c7fedb69 100644
> >>>> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> >>>> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> >>>> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct file;
> >>>> struct inode;
> >>>> struct dentry;
> >>>> struct task_struct;
> >>>> +struct cred;
> >>>> struct user_namespace;
> >>>> struct mnt_idmap;
> >>>>
> >>>> @@ -197,6 +198,10 @@ bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> >>>> const struct inode *inode, int cap);
> >>>> extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> >>>> extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
> >>>> +extern kernel_cap_t cap_bset_effective(const struct task_struct *task,
> >>>> + const struct cred *cred);
> >>>> +extern void cap_bset_drop_fork(struct task_struct *p);
> >>>> +
> >>>> static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
> >>>> {
> >>>> return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> >>>> diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
> >>>> index d45a5476b97d..bda6f18b65b9 100644
> >>>> --- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
> >>>> +++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
> >>>> @@ -98,6 +98,14 @@ struct signal_struct {
> >>>> int quick_threads;
> >>>> struct list_head thread_head;
> >>>>
> >>>> + /*
> >>>> + * Capabilities being removed from the bounding set of every thread in
> >>>> + * this group by PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK. Read on capability-transition
> >>>> + * paths without sighand->siglock, hence atomic64 (a 64-bit value would
> >>>> + * otherwise tear on 32-bit).
> >>>> + */
> >>>> + atomic64_t cap_bset_pending;
> >>>> +
> >>>> wait_queue_head_t wait_chldexit; /* for wait4() */
> >>>>
> >>>> /* current thread group signal load-balancing target: */
> >>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
> >>>> index b6ec6f693719..85ac71897070 100644
> >>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
> >>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
> >>>> @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
> >>>> /* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */
> >>>> #define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
> >>>> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
> >>>> +#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK 82
> >>>>
> >>>> /* Get/set the process' ability to use the timestamp counter instruction */
> >>>> #define PR_GET_TSC 25
> >>>> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> >>>> index 5ef413368912..bf671a85d39d 100644
> >>>> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> >>>> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> >>>> @@ -2504,6 +2504,7 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
> >>>> * before holding sighand lock.
> >>>> */
> >>>> copy_seccomp(p);
> >>>> + cap_bset_drop_fork(p);
> >>>>
> >>>> if (clone_flags & CLONE_NNP)
> >>>> task_set_no_new_privs(p);
> >>>> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> >>>> index 3399535808fe..3bec15d43731 100644
> >>>> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> >>>> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> >>>> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
> >>>> */
> >>>>
> >>>> #include <linux/capability.h>
> >>>> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/audit.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/init.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> >>>> @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@
> >>>> #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/mount.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/sched.h>
> >>>> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/prctl.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/securebits.h>
> >>>> #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
> >>>> @@ -30,6 +32,25 @@
> >>>> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
> >>>> #include <trace/events/capability.h>
> >>>>
> >>>> +/**
> >>>> + * Effective bounding set of @cred in @task's thread group
> >>>> + * @task: task whose thread group's pending drop applies
> >>>> + * @cred: credentials to read the bounding set from
> >>>> + *
> >>>> + * A drop recorded by PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK is authoritative on the thread group
> >>>> + * and may not have been materialized into every thread's cred yet, so the
> >>>> + * effective bounding set is the cred's own set minus the group's pending drop.
> >>>> + */
> >>>> +kernel_cap_t cap_bset_effective(const struct task_struct *task,
> >>>> + const struct cred *cred)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> + kernel_cap_t pending = {
> >>>> + .val = atomic64_read(&task->signal->cap_bset_pending),
> >>>> + };
> >>>> +
> >>>> + return cap_drop(cred->cap_bset, pending);
> >>>> +}
> >>>> +
> >>>> /*
> >>>> * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
> >>>> * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
> >>>> @@ -284,8 +305,8 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
> >>>>
> >>>> if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
> >>>> cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
> >>>> - old->cap_bset)))
> >>>> /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
> >>>> + cap_bset_effective(current, old))))
> >>>> return -EPERM;
> >>>>
> >>>> /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
> >>>> @@ -849,7 +870,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
> >>>> */
> >>>> if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {
> >>>> /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
> >>>> - new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
> >>>> + new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_bset,
> >>>> old->cap_inheritable);
> >>>> }
> >>>> /*
> >>>> @@ -925,6 +946,8 @@ int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
> >>>> int ret;
> >>>> kuid_t root_uid;
> >>>>
> >>>> + new->cap_bset = cap_bset_effective(current, new);
> >>>> +
> >>>> if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
> >>>> return -EPERM;
> >>>>
> >>>> @@ -1283,6 +1306,63 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
> >>>> return commit_creds(new);
> >>>> }
> >>>>
> >>>> +static int cap_bset_drop_process(kernel_cap_t mask)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> + kernel_cap_t pending;
> >>>> + struct cred *new;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + new = prepare_creds();
> >>>> + if (!new)
> >>>> + return -ENOMEM;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + /*
> >>>> + * Record the drop before committing the caller's cred, so that a
> >>>> + * thread created from now on is guaranteed to observe it. Apply the
> >>>> + * current union, not just this call's mask, to the caller's cred.
> >>>> + */
> >>>> + spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
> >>>> + atomic64_or(mask.val, ¤t->signal->cap_bset_pending);
> >>>> + pending.val = atomic64_read(¤t->signal->cap_bset_pending);
> >>>> + spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
> >>>> +
> >>>> + new->cap_bset = cap_drop(new->cap_bset, pending);
> >>>> + commit_creds(new);
> >>>> +
> >>>> + return 0;
> >>>> +}
> >>>> +
> >>>> +/*
> >>>> + * Propagate a pending process-wide bounding-set drop to @p, a task being
> >>>> + * created by the current thread. Threads sharing the group read
> >>>> + * current->signal->cap_bset_pending directly; a forked child gets its own
> >>>> + * signal_struct and must carry the mask itself. Called under
> >>>> + * current->sighand->siglock, which serializes it with cap_bset_drop_process().
> >>>> + */
> >>>> +void cap_bset_drop_fork(struct task_struct *p)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> + kernel_cap_t mask = {
> >>>> + .val = atomic64_read(¤t->signal->cap_bset_pending),
> >>>> + };
> >>>> +
> >>>> + if (cap_isclear(mask) || p->signal == current->signal)
> >>>> + return;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + atomic64_or(mask.val, &p->signal->cap_bset_pending);
> >>>> +}
> >>>> +
> >>>> +static int cap_prctl_drop_mask(unsigned long low, unsigned long high)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> + kernel_cap_t mask = mk_kernel_cap((u32)low, (u32)high);
> >>>> +
> >>>> + if (cap_isclear(mask))
> >>>> + return 0;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
> >>>> + return -EPERM;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + return cap_bset_drop_process(mask);
> >>>> +}
> >>>> +
> >>>> /**
> >>>> * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
> >>>> * @option: The process control function requested
> >>>> @@ -1308,11 +1388,16 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> >>>> case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
> >>>> if (!cap_valid(arg2))
> >>>> return -EINVAL;
> >>>> - return !!cap_raised(old->cap_bset, arg2);
> >>>> + return !!cap_raised(cap_bset_effective(current, old), arg2);
> >>>>
> >>>> case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
> >>>> return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
> >>>>
> >>>> + case PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK:
> >>>> + if (arg4 || arg5)
> >>>> + return -EINVAL;
> >>>> + return cap_prctl_drop_mask(arg2, arg3);
> >>>> +
> >>>> /*
> >>>> * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
> >>>> * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
> >>>> --
> >>>> 2.34.1
>