Re: [PATCH v5 4/8] lsm: Add memcg_charge_task LSM hook

From: Paul Moore

Date: Tue Nov 17 2026 - 17:55:06 EST


On Nov 17, 2026 Albert Esteve <aesteve@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Both DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC and the new DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE ioctl
> accept a charge_fd field that, when set, causes the allocation to be
> charged to an arbitrary process's cgroup rather than the caller's.
>
> Charging is currently limited to the caller's own memcg subtree unless
> the caller holds CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. But the capability is all-or-nothing.
> A process holding it, along with a dma-heap device node or a dma-buf
> fd can charge unlimited memory to any other process's cgroup, potentially
> exhausting that cgroup's limit and triggering OOM kills independent of
> the victim's own activity or privileges.
>
> Add security_memcg_charge_task(), called in get_obj_cgroup_from_fd()
> when charge_fd refers to another process. The hook receives
> the credentials of the allocating process (from) and the credentials
> of the process whose cgroup will be charged (to), giving security
> modules a controlled enforcement point for cross-cgroup objcg
> attribution policy.
>
> When CONFIG_SECURITY is not set the hook compiles to an inline
> returning 0, adding no overhead to the fast path.
>
> Signed-off-by: Albert Esteve <aesteve@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
> mm/memcontrol.c | 11 +++++++++++
> security/security.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)

...

> diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c
> index 03cd90d5e623..2e6fcbe14d43 100644
> --- a/mm/memcontrol.c
> +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
> @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
> #include <linux/lockdep.h>
> #include <linux/resume_user_mode.h>
> #include <linux/psi.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/seq_buf.h>
> #include <linux/sched/isolation.h>
> #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
> @@ -3198,10 +3199,12 @@ static bool mem_cgroup_may_charge(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
> struct obj_cgroup *get_obj_cgroup_from_fd(int fd)
> {
> struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
> + const struct cred *tcred;
> struct obj_cgroup *objcg;
> struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
> struct task_struct *task;
> unsigned int pidfd_flags;
> + int ret;
>
> if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
> return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
> @@ -3226,6 +3229,14 @@ struct obj_cgroup *get_obj_cgroup_from_fd(int fd)
> if (IS_ERR(task))
> return ERR_CAST(task);
>
> + tcred = get_task_cred(task);
> + ret = security_memcg_charge_task(current_cred(), tcred);

Do you ever envision this "from" cred being something other than
current_cred()? If the answer is "no", we might want to consider changing
the LSM hook slightly to help prevent misuse in the future:

int security_current_memcg_charge_task(const struct cred *tcred);

> + put_cred(tcred);
> + if (ret) {
> + put_task_struct(task);
> + return ERR_PTR(ret);
> + }
> +
> rcu_read_lock();
> css = task_css(task, memory_cgrp_id);
> put_task_struct(task);

--
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