Re: [PATCH net] mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled assignment

From: netdev-bot+sashiko

Date: Tue Nov 17 2026 - 21:04:56 EST


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issue(s) to consider.

Critical: 0 · High: 1 · Medium: 0 · Low: 1

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- [High] The fix relies on an invariant that does not hold.
- [Low] The subject 'mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled
assignment' presents a bug fix as a cleanup.

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mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled assignment

The commit removes the assignment hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen from
ieee802154_header_create(). After that, mac802154_set_header_security() is
the only place that sets the security bit. This targets a KMSAN uninit-value
report in ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr(), triggered by a stale cb->secen after
WPAN_SECURITY_ON followed by WPAN_SECURITY_DEFAULT.

> mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled assignment

[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but is "redundant" the right word for this line?

Removing it changes the transmitted frame. When
mac802154_set_header_security() takes this early return, the removed line
was the only thing setting fc.security_enabled:

if (!params.enabled ||
(cb->secen_override && !cb->secen) ||
!params.out_level)
return 0;

This is a fix tagged for stable. Would a subject like "mac802154: fix
uninit-value in ieee802154_header_create()" be more accurate?

> diff --git a/net/mac802154/iface.c b/net/mac802154/iface.c
> index f437b8daa00d0..7b7332805ecce 100644
> --- a/net/mac802154/iface.c
> +++ b/net/mac802154/iface.c
> @@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ static int ieee802154_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> memset(&hdr.fc, 0, sizeof(hdr.fc));
> hdr.fc.type = cb->type;
> - hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;

[Severity: High]
Does this fully close the uninitialized hdr.sec read in
ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr()?

The commit message relies on mac802154_set_header_security() keeping the
invariant that security_enabled = 1 implies hdr->sec is initialized. That
function only writes some of the fields:

net/mac802154/iface.c:mac802154_set_header_security() {
...
hdr->fc.security_enabled = 1;
hdr->sec.level = level;
hdr->sec.key_id_mode = params.out_key.mode;
if (params.out_key.mode == IEEE802154_SCF_KEY_SHORT_INDEX)
hdr->sec.short_src = params.out_key.short_source;
else if (params.out_key.mode == IEEE802154_SCF_KEY_HW_INDEX)
hdr->sec.extended_src = params.out_key.extended_source;
hdr->sec.key_id = params.out_key.id;
...
}

It never writes sec.frame_counter or the reserved bits that share a byte
with level and key_id_mode. In ieee802154_header_create(), hdr is on the
stack and only hdr.fc is cleared by the memset above.
mac802154_header_create() has the same pattern.

So on the normal llsec TX path (llsec enabled, out_level != 0),
ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr() still copies stack memory into the skb:

memcpy(buf, hdr, 1);
memcpy(buf + 1, &hdr->frame_counter, 4);

frame_counter is overwritten only later, in mac802154_llsec_encrypt(). By
then, packet taps in dev_queue_xmit_nit() have already seen the header, as
the TODO comment in net/mac802154/tx.c notes:

dgram_sendmsg()
wpan_dev_hard_header()
ieee802154_header_create()
mac802154_set_header_security()
ieee802154_hdr_push()
ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr()
dev_queue_xmit()
dev_queue_xmit_nit()
ieee802154_subif_start_xmit()
mac802154_llsec_encrypt()

If encryption fails with -ENOKEY or -EOVERFLOW, mac802154_llsec_encrypt()
returns before it pushes the header again. The 4 uninitialized
frame_counter bytes then stay in the data that AF_PACKET taps copy to
userspace.

The reserved bits survive the memcpy(hdr, buf, 1) in
ieee802154_hdr_get_sechdr(). mac802154_llsec_encrypt() then pushes them
again, so they also go out over the air and into the CCM AAD.

Should hdr (or at least hdr.sec) be zero-initialized in both
ieee802154_header_create() and mac802154_header_create()? Another option
is to memset hdr->sec in mac802154_set_header_security() before filling it.

> hdr.fc.ack_request = cb->ackreq;
> hdr.seq = atomic_inc_return(&dev->ieee802154_ptr->dsn) & 0xFF;
>

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Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20261116065235.27348-1-petrvaganoff%40gmail.com