Re: [PATCH v2 18/19] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust

From: Leon Romanovsky

Date: Wed Nov 18 2026 - 08:12:45 EST


On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:33:45PM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> On 17/11/26 23:48, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 05:13:59PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
> > > On 10/11/2026 12:22 pm, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Nov 09, 2026 at 01:53:02PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
> > > > > On 09/11/2026 7:33 am, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > > > > [...]
> > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
> > > > > > index b486b8bbd1fcd..8be2a246d4903 100644
> > > > > > --- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
> > > > > > +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
> > > > > > @@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static int iommu_get_def_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group,
> > > > > > static int iommu_get_default_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group,
> > > > > > int target_type)
> > > > > > {
> > > > > > - struct device *untrusted = NULL;
> > > > > > + struct device *restricted = NULL;
> > > > > > struct group_device *gdev;
> > > > > > int driver_type = 0;
> > > > > > @@ -1901,14 +1901,15 @@ static int iommu_get_default_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group,
> > > > > > driver_type = iommu_get_def_domain_type(group, gdev->dev,
> > > > > > driver_type);
> > > > > > - if (dev_is_pci(gdev->dev) && to_pci_dev(gdev->dev)->untrusted) {
> > > > > > + if (dev_is_pci(gdev->dev) &&
> > > > > > + pci_dev_default_is_restricted(to_pci_dev(gdev->dev))) {
> > > > >
> > > > > I think this should be the generic device_is_adversarial(gdev->dev) now - in
> > > > > fact probably all the dev_is_pci()/to_pci_dev() stanzas aren't conceptually
> > > > > PCI-specific, just an artefact of the current "untrusted" flag being so.
> > > >
> > > > I wanted to do the same, but iommu_get_default_domain_type() may be called
> > > > before the PCI device's trust level has been set. At that point, we are
> > > > still in "disabled" mode, whereas device_is_adversarial() checks for
> > > > "adversarial" mode.
> > > >
> > > > The below is from AI, I asked to present me the path for that:
> > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > For a newly discovered PCI device with an available IOMMU and a new IOMMU group:
> > > > pci_scan_single_device()
> > > > pci_device_add()
> > > > device_add()
> > > > bus_notify(dev, BUS_NOTIFY_ADD_DEVICE)
> > > > blocking_notifier_call_chain()
> > > > notifier_call_chain()
> > > > iommu_bus_notifier()
> > > > iommu_probe_device(dev)
> > > > __iommu_probe_device(dev, NULL)
> > > > iommu_setup_default_domain(group, 0)
> > > > iommu_get_default_domain_type(group, 0)
> > > >
> > > > For a device whose initial policy is adversary, its state during that call is:
> > > > dev->trust_policy = DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY
> > > > dev->trust_level = DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED
> > > > dev->trust_committed_level = DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED
> > > > dev->driver = NULL
> > > >
> > > > device_is_adversarial(dev) = false
> > > >
> > > > The active level changes later, during binding:
> > > > really_probe()
> > > > device_trust_prepare()
> > > > __device_trust_prepare()
> > > > WRITE_ONCE(dev->trust_level, DEVICE_TRUST_ADVERSARY)
> > > > dev->bus->dma_configure()
> > > > call_driver_probe()
> > >
> > > OK, that seems less than ideal. Feels like it would be better if bus code
> > > set the initial device state prior to device_add, so then it only ever
> > > changes later as a result of an explicit attestation/acceptance process. If
> > > the initial IOMMU probe still has to poke into bus-specific code to avoid
> > > always making a worst-case assumption, doesn't that rather defeat the point
> > > of having a generic abstraction?
> >
> > As Jason said, this is part of a very large series. Each series is an
> > adventure in itself. Even Greg's seemingly simple request to convert the
> > USB authorization knob to this new scheme has been extremely painful
> > because of AI reviews. They keep pointing out bugs and gaps that are
> > automatically attributed to me simply because I'm touching that part of
> > the code.
> >
> > >
> > > Even with the slightly dubious argument that this series only intends to
> > > shuffle the existing PCI code around rather than fully introduce the generic
> > > abstraction that it claims to, if the PCI behaviour is still just based on
> > > propagating the internal "untrusted" flag plus the new global override, both
> > > of which *are* known at add_device time into the common trust state, then
> > > there seems little excuse for not doing that up-front so that the new API
> > > *can* just work as expected.
> >
> > I would prefer to keep both PCI and USB out of this series on device trust
> > levels. Let's see what people say if I drop them in v3.
>
>
> I'd rather you did not as it is going to make experiments with CoCo VMs harder.

I haven't dropped it yet :(, but it's unlikely that you need USB there.
Regarding PCI, these patches convert the ->untrusted knob, which is
orthogonal to your experiments.

<...>

> > > Urgh, I can be absolutely certain I'm not the only one who is going to be
> > > confused this way... I see "disabled" and instinctively take it to mean
> > > disabling the device_trust *mechanism*, as the logical thing that people
> > > will reach for in terms of "I don't care what this new thing is, just get it
> > > out of my way and let my drivers work like they always used to; I want to
> > > disable the new thing."
> >
> > I completely agree. I was under the impression that these names had already
> > been decided, since I picked up where Dan left off.>>
> > > From there it then also makes perfect self-consistent sense that
> > > "device_trust=full" would be the opposite end of the scale as in "Apply the
> > > explicit trust model 'fully', to all devices regardless of their bus-level
> > > default."
> > >
> > > Now I guess you could name it something like "device.default_trust_level" to
> > > attempt to make it clearer that it represents a value the value represents
> > > the "trust" *of* each individual device itself, but TBH it's still liable to
> > > look backwards to many users - similarly it's hard to guess that
> > > FOO_POLICY_DISABLED might mean something entirely different from "don't
> > > enforce the policy for FOO.", thus rather than try to contort the naming of
> > > everything, I'd still be much more inclined to just flip the meanings to be
> > > more intuitive from the outsider perspective.
> > >
> > > Say you upgrade your kernel and find your boot is broken because it now
> > > flibbles, but at least there is a "flibble" parameter whose values are
> > > "disabled", "wibble" and "frobble". Are you really going to spend time
> > > straight off reading up on what flibbling is to understand what wibbles and
> > > frobbles mean? Or is your instinct just going to be to try the seemingly
> > > obvious way of disabling flibbling, and then getting positively annoyed if
> > > that only makes it flibble harder?
> >
> > What about: blocked, adversarial and unrestricted
>
> yes, that's better.
>
> > instead of: disabled, adversarial and full
>
> may be simplify: blocked, restricted, unrestricted? Thanks,

"adversarial" is Dan's legacy, let's keep that name.

>
>
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> > >
> > > Robin.
>
> --
> Alexey
>