[PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation

From: Mickaël Salaün

Date: Wed Nov 18 2026 - 09:54:55 EST


Test that Landlock denies and logs a privileged PR_SET_SECUREBITS
change, now that the previous commit routes its CAP_SETPCAP check
through the capable hooks, and that an unprivileged change still
succeeds. The domain deallocation record must then report exactly one
denial, which proves that the unprivileged change was not denied,
without relying on a no-record timeout.

The check-exec selftests already cover commoncap's securebits semantics.
Without the previous commit, this test fails.

Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---

Changes since v2:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261117101738.2523492-3-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Use ASSERT_EQ() before checking errno (suggested by Günther Noack).
- Shorten the commit message.
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 69 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
index 7c58ece1c6f0..35a419c46764 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
@@ -1071,6 +1071,75 @@ TEST_F(cap_audit, denied)
EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
}

+/*
+ * A privileged denial allocates the domain ID. The following unprivileged-only
+ * change must not create a hidden Landlock denial, so the domain's deallocation
+ * record must report exactly one denial.
+ */
+TEST_F(cap_audit, securebits)
+{
+ const unsigned long unpriv = SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE |
+ SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+ __u64 *domain_id, deallocated_dom = 0;
+ unsigned long bits;
+ int err, ruleset_fd, status;
+ pid_t child;
+
+ domain_id = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*domain_id), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(MAP_FAILED, domain_id);
+ *domain_id = 0;
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_cap_ruleset();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ /* Allow the child to replace the audit filter before exiting. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL));
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+ bits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
+ bits | SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_cap(self->audit_fd, CAP_SETPCAP));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd,
+ getpid(), domain_id));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, bits | unpriv));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+
+ /* Receive the asynchronous domain deallocation record. */
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_filter_drop(self->audit_fd, AUDIT_ADD_RULE));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0,
+ audit_filter_exe(self->audit_fd, &self->audit_filter,
+ AUDIT_DEL_RULE));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+
+ _exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || !WIFEXITED(status) ||
+ WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_SUCCESS)
+ _metadata->exit_code = KSFT_FAIL;
+
+ EXPECT_NE(0, *domain_id);
+ err = matches_log_domain_deallocated(self->audit_fd, 1, *domain_id,
+ &deallocated_dom);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, err);
+ EXPECT_EQ(*domain_id, deallocated_dom);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(domain_id, sizeof(*domain_id)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+}
+
/*
* Denials in the capset and mmap_addr paths are audited like capable hook
* denials. The vm_enough_memory hook only withholds the admin reserve, with
--
2.56.0