Re: [PATCH for-next v3 7/7] mm/slab: call debug_locks and KCSAN checks in kfree_nolock()
From: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
Date: Wed Nov 18 2026 - 11:58:34 EST
On 11/15/26 16:09, Harry Yoo (Meta) wrote:
> kfree_nolock() skips free hooks that may acquire spinlocks because it
> can be called from any context. debug_check_no_locks_freed() and
> __kcsan_check_access() are skipped as well.
>
> However, they acquire a spinlock only when they report a bug.
> debug_check_no_locks_freed() disables interrupts and walks
> current->held_locks, and reaches printk only when a held lock is inside
> the freed object. KCSAN takes report_lock only when it observes a race.
>
> Just like KASAN, take the risk of potential deadlock for bug reporting.
> Call debug_check_no_locks_freed() and __kcsan_check_access() regardless
> of allow_spin.
>
> Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo (Meta) <harry@xxxxxxxxxx>
Seems fair.
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) <vbabka@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> mm/slub.c | 25 ++++++++++++-------------
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index fd3de3bee1de..fad19ec6af4b 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -2708,19 +2708,25 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, unsigned int free_flags)
>
> kmsan_slab_free(s, x);
>
> + /*
> + * debug_locks, KCSAN, KASAN may acquire a spinlock to report a bug,
> + * but otherwise cannot deadlock. Take the risk of deadlock for
> + * reporting.
> + */
> + debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
> +
> + /* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */
> + if (!still_accessible)
> + __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
> + KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
> +
> /* Hooks that acquire locks or kmalloc_nolock() skips alloc hook counterpart */
> if (likely(allow_spin)) {
> kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
> - debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
>
> if (!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS))
> debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size);
>
> - /* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */
> - if (!still_accessible)
> - __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
> - KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
> -
> if (kfence_free(x))
> return false;
> }
> @@ -2728,13 +2734,6 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, unsigned int free_flags)
> /*
> * Give KASAN a chance to notice an invalid free operation before we
> * modify the object.
> - *
> - * If KASAN finds a bug it will do kasan_report_invalid_free() which
> - * will call raw_spin_lock_irqsave() which is technically unsafe from
> - * NMI, but take chance and report kernel bug. The sequence of
> - * kasan_report_invalid_free() -> raw_spin_lock_irqsave() -> NMI
> - * -> kfree_nolock() -> kasan_report_invalid_free() on the same CPU
> - * is double buggy and deserves to deadlock.
> */
> if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x))
> return false;
>