Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr

From: Mickaël Salaün

Date: Wed Nov 18 2026 - 12:00:59 EST


On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 03:23:56PM +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:52AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > Until now, a process in a domain that denies CAP_SYS_RAWIO could still
> > map memory below the vm.mmap_min_addr limit if it held this capability.
> > cap_mmap_addr() is commoncap's mmap_addr hook, and it checks
> > CAP_SYS_RAWIO with cap_capable(), not security_capable(), so the check
> > never reaches hook_capable(). Mapping the lowest pages is what this
> > limit protects against, because it helps to exploit kernel NULL pointer
> > dereferences.
> >
> > Add a Landlock mmap_addr hook that checks CAP_SYS_RAWIO against the
> > domain under the same condition as cap_mmap_addr(). With the same
> > vm.mmap_min_addr value, the hook only denies mappings for which
> > commoncap required the capability. security_mmap_addr() stops at
> > commoncap's error, so processes without the capability get the same
> > result as before. This also covers the x86 vm86(2) and vm86old(2)
> > system calls, which use the same check for address 0.
> >
> > Making cap_mmap_addr() call capable() would also fix this, but it would
> > send every low mapping through the capable hook of all LSMs (SELinux,
> > AppArmor, SafeSetID, BPF LSM programs), adding capability checks that
> > their policies never had to handle. For instance, SELinux checks
> > mmap_zero in its own mmap_addr hook and keeps it separate from the
> > capability on purpose. LSMs with their own policy for low mappings
> > implement it in this hook, so Landlock does the same.
> >
> > Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >
> > Changes since v1:
> > https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-3-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx
> > - Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
> > ---
> > security/landlock/cap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
> > index fa59118e3486..10e1ca772b9c 100644
> > --- a/security/landlock/cap.c
> > +++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
> > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
> > #include <linux/cred.h>
> > #include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
> > #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> > +#include <linux/security.h>
> > #include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
> >
> > #include "cap.h"
> > @@ -90,8 +91,29 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> > return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
> > }
> >
> > +/**
> > + * hook_mmap_addr - Restrict mappings below dac_mmap_min_addr
> > + *
> > + * @addr: Address of the new mapping.
> > + *
> > + * cap_mmap_addr() requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO to map below dac_mmap_min_addr, but
> > + * calls cap_capable() directly, which skips hook_capable(). Check the same
> > + * condition against the domain. commoncap runs first, so this only sees
> > + * mappings that commoncap allowed.
> > + *
> > + * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if CAP_SYS_RAWIO use is denied.
> > + */
> > +static int hook_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
> > +{
> > + if (addr >= dac_mmap_min_addr)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + return check_cap(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO, CAP_OPT_NONE);
> > +}
> > +
> > static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, hook_mmap_addr),
> > };
> >
> > __init void landlock_add_cap_hooks(void)
> > --
> > 2.56.0
> >
>
> Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Looks good; I compared this against the commoncap implementation of
> the same hook, and the logic checks out.
>
>
> Minor nit, in case you end up sending a V3; I found the commit message
> a bit wordy.

Indeed, I'll send a v3 with your feedback.

>
> It makes intuitively sense that the commoncap LSM does not want to
> invoke functions which themselves call into LSM hooks, even if it's
> just a safeguard to prevent accidental recursion or deep call stacks.
>
> So for the few cases where commoncap checks capabilities directly, we
> need to do the equivalent checks in the same LSM hooks in Landlock.
> That means, we replicate the logic from the commoncap hook if
> necessary and treat it like a capability use that came in through the
> normal hook. This is similar to what SELinux already does as well.
>
> What I would have found useful to discuss in this commit message would
> have been the story of PF_SUPERPRIV:
>
> commoncap sets PF_SUPERPRIV when granting the capability use, and
> Landlock does not undo that when it rejects the capability use. In my
> understanding this is OK because the flag only gets used in "legacy
> accounting" use cases and the consequences are benign. The
> interaction with SELinux is already the same as well - it does not
> unset that flag.

Good catch! I think it should not be addressed by this series but I
just sent a fix for that:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261118165603.2573289-1-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx

>
> —Günther
>