Re: [PATCH v2 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation

From: Mickaël Salaün

Date: Wed Nov 18 2026 - 12:21:16 EST


On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 05:25:07PM +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:56AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > Some documented claims about LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE do not
> > hold for every capability check. Remove them instead of listing their
> > exceptions, and call it a permission instead of a hook.
> >
> > Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >
> > Changes since v1:
> > https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-7-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx
> > - Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
> > ---
> > Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 8 ++++----
> > Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 8 ++++----
> > include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 6 +++---
> > 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
> > index d81f1c2cd236..98c2e7139e8d 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
> > @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation
> > ==================================
> >
> > :Author: Mickaël Salaün
> > -:Date: October 2026
> > +:Date: November 2026
> >
> > Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
> > harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process,
> > @@ -359,9 +359,9 @@ framework in ``log.c``, compiled under ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG``
> > (automatically selected by ``CONFIG_AUDIT`` or ``CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS``).
> >
> > Audit records respect audit configuration, the domain's Landlock log
> > -flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``. Tracepoints fire unconditionally,
> > -independent of these settings. The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
> > -always incremented regardless of logging configuration.
> > +flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``. Tracepoints fire independently of
> > +these settings. The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
> > +incremented regardless of logging configuration.
> >
> > Each denial tracepoint carries a ``logged`` field reporting the
> > audit-logging verdict: whether the denial would be written to the audit
> > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> > index 3d45b956b640..d00e94d8ed37 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> > @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
> > =====================================
> >
> > :Author: Mickaël Salaün
> > -:Date: October 2026
> > +:Date: November 2026
> >
> > The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global
> > filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
> > @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ acquisition via :manpage:`open_tree(2)` / :manpage:`fsmount(2)`. Namespaces
> > the process is already a member of when the domain is enforced are implicitly
> > allowed (the process could not continue running otherwise); rules describe
> > which new namespace types the process may acquire.
> > -``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates every exercise of a capability
> > +``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates the exercise of capabilities
> > after the domain is enforced, regardless
> > of how the capability was obtained (inherited credentials, ``CLONE_NEWUSER``
> > grant, ``setuid``/file-cap-bearing :manpage:`execve(2)`, etc.). Configuring
> > @@ -641,9 +641,9 @@ after a domain is enforced through user namespace entry or :manpage:`capset(2)`;
> > privileged sandboxes that did not set ``PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` may also gain
> > capabilities through :manpage:`execve(2)` of binaries with file capabilities.
> > In all cases, :manpage:`capget(2)` will report the credential's capability sets,
> > -but any denied capability will fail with ``EPERM`` when exercised. Do not rely
> > +but any denied capability will fail when exercised. Do not rely
> > on :manpage:`capget(2)` to determine whether the policy permits a given
> > -capability; only the actual operation will return ``EPERM`` upon denial.
> > +capability.
> >
> > Truncating files
> > ----------------
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> > index 24510e5d8479..c9e4ce23778b 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> > @@ -622,9 +622,9 @@ struct landlock_capability_attr {
> > * - %LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE: Restrict the use of specific Linux
> > * capabilities. A process in a Landlock domain that handles this permission
> > * is denied from exercising capabilities that are not explicitly allowed by a
> > - * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This hook is purely restrictive: it can
> > - * deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can never
> > - * grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in
> > + * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This permission is purely restrictive: it
>
> "The permission is purely restrictive"... that sounds like an
> oxymoron, similar for "[The permission] can deny capabilities..." in
> the sentence below.
>
> It is not complicated though; How about just shortening the sentences
> "This hook is purely restrictive: it can deny ..., but it can never
> grant capabilities that the kernel already denied" down to
>
> Landlock only reduces the capabilities that processes can use. It
> does not let processes use capabilities that they don't already have
> without Landlock.

Much better, thanks!

>
> ?
>
> > + * can deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can
> > + * never grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in
> > * Landlock ABI version 12.
> > */
> > #define LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE (1ULL << 0)
> > --
> > 2.56.0
> >
>
> Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
>