Re: [PATCH] mm/secretmem: Keep locked memory accounting until inode eviction

From: David Hildenbrand (Arm)

Date: Wed Nov 18 2026 - 18:00:10 EST


On 10/30/26 16:24, Baek Kyu, Kim wrote:
> A secretmem inode can outlive its original file. An O_PATH descriptor
> opened through /proc/self/fd keeps the inode and its unevictable folios
> alive after the mapping and original descriptor are closed. The file
> release path nevertheless drops the locked-memory charge, allowing the
> same user to reuse RLIMIT_MEMLOCK while those folios remain allocated.
>
> Move private-state and locked-memory accounting cleanup to inode eviction,
> after truncating the page cache. Keep secretmem_users active over the same
> lifetime so that the hibernation guard covers retained secret pages. Let
> iput() handle file-creation failures and tolerate an inode with no private
> state.
>
> Fixes: 97d34aa65c29 ("mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages")
> Signed-off-by: Baek Kyu, Kim <pocj8ur4in@xxxxxxxxx>

Lorenzo, Mike, this problem seems real to me. Can you take a look?

> ---
> On an arm64 QEMU guest with an 8 KiB RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, an O_PATH reference
> retained two secretmem pages. The baseline dropped the charge to zero and
> allowed a further one-page fault; the patch kept both pages charged and
> rejected that fault until the last path reference closed. The Image
> was built with KASAN and lockdep. Hibernation, other architectures,
> and long-running concurrency were not tested.
>
> mm/secretmem.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
> index 384f5cfc457f..fa8be360bd2a 100644
> --- a/mm/secretmem.c
> +++ b/mm/secretmem.c
> @@ -185,18 +185,14 @@ static void secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(struct inode *inode)
> {
> struct secretmem_inode_state *state = inode->i_private;
>
> + if (!state)
> + return;
> +
> secretmem_unaccount_all_folios(state);
> free_uid(state->user);
> kfree(state);
> inode->i_private = NULL;
> -}
> -
> -static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> -{
> atomic_dec(&secretmem_users);
> - secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
> -
> - return 0;
> }
>
> static int secretmem_mmap_prepare(struct vm_area_desc *desc)
> @@ -216,7 +212,6 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> }
>
> static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
> - .release = secretmem_release,
> .mmap_prepare = secretmem_mmap_prepare,
> };
>
> @@ -274,6 +269,7 @@ static int secretmem_init_inode_priv(struct inode *inode)
>
> state->user = get_uid(current_user());
> inode->i_private = state;
> + atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -296,7 +292,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
> O_RDWR | O_LARGEFILE, &secretmem_fops);
> if (IS_ERR(file)) {
> err = PTR_ERR(file);
> - goto err_free_priv;
> + goto err_free_inode;
> }
>
> mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER);
> @@ -309,11 +305,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
> inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
> inode->i_size = 0;
>
> - atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
> -
> return file;
> -err_free_priv:
> - secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
> err_free_inode:
> iput(inode);
> return ERR_PTR(err);
> @@ -335,6 +327,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
> return FD_ADD(flags & O_CLOEXEC, secretmem_file_create(flags));
> }
>
> +static void secretmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
> + clear_inode(inode);
> + secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
> +}
> +
> +static const struct super_operations secretmem_super_ops = {
> + .statfs = simple_statfs,
> + .evict_inode = secretmem_evict_inode,
> +};
> +
> static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
> {
> struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx;
> @@ -342,6 +346,7 @@ static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
> ctx = init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC);
> if (!ctx)
> return -ENOMEM;
> + ctx->ops = &secretmem_super_ops;
>
> return 0;
> }


--
Cheers,

David