Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read
From: Demi Marie Obenour
Date: Wed Nov 18 2026 - 23:35:56 EST
On 11/18/26 7:43 PM, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
>>> On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote:
>>>> This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can
>>>> use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256
>>>> and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that
>>>> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation.
>>>
>>> I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective,
>>> this encourages very poor practices. AES-GCM even allows userspace
>>> to extract the secret authentication key.
>>>
>>> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined
>>> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday
>>> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless
>>> the key is ephemeral.
>>>
>>> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting
>>> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API
>>> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the
>>> authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't
>>> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case,
>>> and the API can't enforce that limit.
>>>
>>> For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices.
>>> They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them
>>> at random for each encryption without any problems.
>>>
>>> - XAES-256-GCM
>>> - XChaCha20-Poly1305
>>> - AEGIS-256
>>>
>>> AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally
>>> leaking if two plaintexts are equal. This happens whenever there is
>>> a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions.
>>
>> The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular
>> relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type.
>>
>> At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down
>> the potential user base.
>>
>> The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use
>> trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem
>> that only this patch set can presumebly sort out.
>>
>> And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much
>> the break down of what is wrong here.
>>
>> If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that
>> it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really.
>>
>> These are the main topics what I would focus on.
>
> This whole patchset looks like a solution looking for a problem.
>
> The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service
> like ssh-agent. Then you can do whatever key management you want.
> That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you
> have bigger problems.
Also, if you need keys stored in hardware for some reason (compliance,
time-limited exfiltration), you can use a userspace library or
daemon that abstracts over whatever the hardware-specific API is.
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
Attachment:
OpenPGP_signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature