Re: Stopping buffer-overflow security exploits using page protection

From: James Sutherland (jas88@cam.ac.uk)
Date: Sat Jul 29 2000 - 04:22:46 EST


On Fri, 28 Jul 2000, Bruce Perens wrote:

> Hi,
>
> Please see http://technocrat.net/964824712/ . Is there any good
> reason that we can not run Linux executables with the execute permission
> turned off, by default, on all stack and data pages?

Sounds suspiciously like a non-exec stack to me - there has been plenty of
discussion of how/why that achieves nothing (you just need to change the
exploit code slightly).

> Wouldn't this stop buffer-overflow security exploits that try to
> inject executable code onto the stack or into function tables? i386
> won't support it, but other architectures do.

It doesn't stop anything - just changes the nature of the exploit needed
(i.e. the skr1pt k1dd13s need to find v2 of their little skr1pt). The
opinion round here seems to be that this isn't worth the hassle?

James.

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