On Wed, Apr 18, 2001 at 12:14:56PM +0100, Chris Evans wrote:
> To justify this, consider if len were set to minus 2 billion. This will
> pass the sanity check, and pass the value straight on to copy_to_user. The
> copy_to_user parameter is unsigned, so this value because approximately
> +2Gb.
For ARM, this isn't a problem (we do 33-bit arithmetic in access_ok
specifically to catch this type of thing). x86 does the same thing (or
did when I wrote the code for ARM.
> Now, providing the malicious user passes a low user space pointer (e.g.
> just above 0), the kernel's virtual address space wrap check will not
> trigger because ~0 + ~2Gb does not exceed 4G. And the result is the user
> being able to read kernel memory.
But ~0 + ~2GB = ~2GB. Last time I checked, ~2GB is less than 3GB, and 3GB
is the start of kernel memory on x86. Therefore, I don't see that the
user will be able to read kernel memory.
--
Russell King (rmk@arm.linux.org.uk) The developer of ARM Linux
http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html
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This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Apr 23 2001 - 21:00:26 EST