Cryto verification of Kernel against Trojan code??

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On Thursday 03 January 2002 06:35, Alan Cox wrote:
> > binary may have bugs, security holes, race conditions etc; it may be
> > hacked post boot (no so easy to do to the live kernel image), etc
>
> Just like the kernel, only the binary is a little less dangerous. Hacking
> live kernel images is trivial also btw. There are tools for it.

And that brings me to my crazy thought for the day. System.map is
what is says, a map of the system. Would it make any sense to compute
an md5 hash on it and use it as a means of verifying that the kernel is
clean from tampering? (That's assuming that the hackers didn't replace
syscalls with a trojan with exactly the same size and same location.)

-- 
timothy.covell@ashavan.org.
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