Re: PATCH - ext2fs privacy (i.e. secure deletion) patch

[the grugq]

> But what happens when the 'setgid' bit is put on a directory? At least 
> in 2.4 existing files do NOT get the group set, only files newly 
> created. So unless someone feels that's a bug which needs immediate 
> fixing, I can point to it as a model by which the feature could be 
> practically implemented.

Implementing the privacy patch based on the suggestions put forward 
(chattr +s && mount options), i've hit something of a snag.

If a directory has "chattr +s" then whenever a directory entry is 
deleted, should the dirent contents be overwritten, or should only freed 
blocks be overwritten? It makes sense to me that the directory entry 
should be overwritten because it is inaccessible meta-data and exposes 
information about the file system. Since the user obviously wants the 
directory to be securely deleted, that could be construed as implying 
they want sensitive directory content securely deleted as well.



--gq
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