Re: compute_creds fixup in -mm
From: Chris Wright
Date: Wed Apr 21 2004 - 13:30:34 EST
* Stephen Smalley (sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx) wrote:
> On Wed, 2004-04-21 at 13:27, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > This doesn't fix selinux, though -- its apply_creds hook just blindly calls
> > commoncap's. In fact, this breaks all attempts to get nested capability modules
> > right. The problem is that, AFAICS, not only does ptrace_detach not take
> > task_lock, _exit() doesn't either. So you get an equivalent race for the shared
> > state check. I see two ways to fix that:
>
> I didn't see Chris' patch. I assume that the worst case is unexpected
> program failure due to lack of capability, right? The SELinux security
The opposite. You'd get a program with non-root euid, but full
capability set, and AT_SECURE set false. My patch is below.
--- a/security/commoncap.c~compute_creds-lock 2004-04-21 00:54:34.000000000 -0700
+++ b/security/commoncap.c 2004-04-21 01:01:00.000000000 -0700
@@ -135,28 +135,26 @@
task_lock(current);
- if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) {
+ if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
+ !cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
current->mm->dumpable = 0;
- if (must_not_trace_exec(current) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
- bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
- bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
+ if (must_not_trace_exec(current)) {
+ if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
+ bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
+ }
+ if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) {
+ new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted,
+ current->cap_permitted);
+ }
+
}
}
current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
- if (!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
-
- if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) {
- new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted,
- current->
- cap_permitted);
- }
- }
-
/* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
* in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
* capability rules */
-
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