Re: [PATCH 0/2] capabilities

[Paul Jakma]

On Wed, 12 May 2004, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

> Like something that turns KEEPCAPS on then setuid()s then executes
> an untrusted program?  It's obviously wrong, but it's secure
> currently since the exec wipes capabilities.  And no one would
> notice.  Ugh!

Definitely wrong. 

> The prctl would defeat the purpose (imagine if bash forgot the
> prctl -- then the whole thing is pointless).

Capabilities aware programmes are most likely already setting
PR_SET_KEEPCAPS anyway if they're doing anything half-fancy. Another 
prctl() wont hurt too much if it is the only way to guarantee 
backward compatible security (?).

regards,
-- 
Paul Jakma	paul@xxxxxxxx	paul@xxxxxxxxx	Key ID: 64A2FF6A
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