[2.6 patch] remove unused net/sunrpc/svcauth_des.c

[Adrian Bunk]

I wasn't able to find any usage of this file.


diffstat output:
 net/sunrpc/svcauth_des.c |  215 ---------------------------------------
 1 files changed, 215 deletions(-)


Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@xxxxxxxxx>

--- linux-2.6.10-rc2-mm4-full/net/sunrpc/svcauth_des.c	2004-10-18 23:54:37.000000000 +0200
+++ /dev/null	2004-11-25 03:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * linux/net/sunrpc/svcauth_des.c
- *
- * Server-side AUTH_DES handling.
- * 
- * Copyright (C) 1996, 1997 Olaf Kirch <okir@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- */
-
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/sunrpc/types.h>
-#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
-#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
-#include <linux/sunrpc/svcsock.h>
-
-#define RPCDBG_FACILITY	RPCDBG_AUTH
-
-/*
- * DES cedential cache.
- * The cache is indexed by fullname/key to allow for multiple sessions
- * by the same user from different hosts.
- * It would be tempting to use the client's IP address rather than the
- * conversation key as an index, but that could become problematic for
- * multi-homed hosts that distribute traffic across their interfaces.
- */
-struct des_cred {
-	struct des_cred *	dc_next;
-	char *			dc_fullname;
-	u32			dc_nickname;
-	des_cblock		dc_key;		/* conversation key */
-	des_cblock		dc_xkey;	/* encrypted conv. key */
-	des_key_schedule	dc_keysched;
-};
-
-#define ADN_FULLNAME		0
-#define ADN_NICKNAME		1
-
-/*
- * The default slack allowed when checking for replayed credentials
- * (in milliseconds).
- */
-#define DES_REPLAY_SLACK	2000
-
-/*
- * Make sure we don't place more than one call to the key server at
- * a time.
- */
-static int			in_keycall;
-
-#define FAIL(err) \
-	{ if (data) put_cred(data);			\
-	  *authp = rpc_autherr_##err;			\
-	  return;					\
-	}
-
-void
-svcauth_des(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 *statp, u32 *authp)
-{
-	struct svc_buf	*argp = &rqstp->rq_argbuf;
-	struct svc_buf	*resp = &rqstp->rq_resbuf;
-	struct svc_cred	*cred = &rqstp->rq_cred;
-	struct des_cred	*data = NULL;
-	u32		cryptkey[2];
-	u32		cryptbuf[4];
-	u32		*p = argp->buf;
-	int		len   = argp->len, slen, i;
-
-	*authp = rpc_auth_ok;
-
-	if ((argp->len -= 3) < 0) {
-		*statp = rpc_garbage_args;
-		return;
-	}
-
-	p++;					/* skip length field */
-	namekind = ntohl(*p++);			/* fullname/nickname */
-
-	/* Get the credentials */
-	if (namekind == ADN_NICKNAME) {
-		/* If we can't find the cached session key, initiate a
-		 * new session. */
-		if (!(data = get_cred_bynick(*p++)))
-			FAIL(rejectedcred);
-	} else if (namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) {
-		p = xdr_decode_string(p, &fullname, &len, RPC_MAXNETNAMELEN);
-		if (p == NULL)
-			FAIL(badcred);
-		cryptkey[0] = *p++;		/* get the encrypted key */
-		cryptkey[1] = *p++;
-		cryptbuf[2] = *p++;		/* get the encrypted window */
-	} else {
-		FAIL(badcred);
-	}
-
-	/* If we're just updating the key, silently discard the request. */
-	if (data && data->dc_locked) {
-		*authp = rpc_autherr_dropit;
-		_put_cred(data);	/* release but don't unlock */
-		return;
-	}
-
-	/* Get the verifier flavor and length */
-	if (ntohl(*p++) != RPC_AUTH_DES && ntohl(*p++) != 12)
-		FAIL(badverf);
-
-	cryptbuf[0] = *p++;			/* encrypted time stamp */
-	cryptbuf[1] = *p++;
-	cryptbuf[3] = *p++;			/* 0 or window - 1 */
-
-	if (namekind == ADN_NICKNAME) {
-		status = des_ecb_encrypt((des_block *) cryptbuf,
-					 (des_block *) cryptbuf,
-					 data->dc_keysched, DES_DECRYPT);
-	} else {
-		/* We first have to decrypt the new session key and
-		 * fill in the UNIX creds. */
-		if (!(data = get_cred_byname(rqstp, authp, fullname, cryptkey)))
-			return;
-		status = des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *) cryptbuf,
-					 (des_cblock *) cryptbuf, 16,
-					 data->dc_keysched,
-					 (des_cblock *) &ivec,
-					 DES_DECRYPT);
-	}
-	if (status) {
-		printk("svcauth_des: DES decryption failed (status %d)\n",
-				status);
-		FAIL(badverf);
-	}
-
-	/* Now check the whole lot */
-	if (namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) {
-		unsigned long	winverf;
-
-		data->dc_window = ntohl(cryptbuf[2]);
-		winverf = ntohl(cryptbuf[2]);
-		if (window != winverf - 1) {
-			printk("svcauth_des: bad window verifier!\n");
-			FAIL(badverf);
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* XDR the decrypted timestamp */
-	cryptbuf[0] = ntohl(cryptbuf[0]);
-	cryptbuf[1] = ntohl(cryptbuf[1]);
-	if (cryptbuf[1] > 1000000) {
-		dprintk("svcauth_des: bad usec value %u\n", cryptbuf[1]);
-		if (namekind == ADN_NICKNAME)
-			FAIL(rejectedverf);
-		FAIL(badverf);
-	}
-	
-	/*
-	 * Check for replayed credentials. We must allow for reordering
-	 * of requests by the network, and the OS scheduler, hence we
-	 * cannot expect timestamps to be increasing monotonically.
-	 * This opens a small security hole, therefore the replay_slack
-	 * value shouldn't be too large.
-	 */
-	if ((delta = cryptbuf[0] - data->dc_timestamp[0]) <= 0) {
-		switch (delta) {
-		case -1:	
-			delta = -1000000;
-		case 0:
-			delta += cryptbuf[1] - data->dc_timestamp[1];
-			break;
-		default:
-			delta = -1000000;
-		}
-		if (delta < DES_REPLAY_SLACK)
-			FAIL(rejectedverf);
-#ifdef STRICT_REPLAY_CHECKS
-		/* TODO: compare time stamp to last five timestamps cached
-		 * and reject (drop?) request if a match is found. */
-#endif
-	}
-
-	now = xtime;
-	now.tv_secs -= data->dc_window;
-	if (now.tv_secs < cryptbuf[0] ||
-	    (now.tv_secs == cryptbuf[0] && now.tv_usec < cryptbuf[1]))
-		FAIL(rejectedverf);
-
-	/* Okay, we're done. Update the lot */
-	if (namekind == ADN_FULLNAME)
-		data->dc_valid = 1;
-	data->dc_timestamp[0] = cryptbuf[0];
-	data->dc_timestamp[1] = cryptbuf[1];
-
-	put_cred(data);
-	return;
-garbage:
-	*statp = rpc_garbage_args;
-	return;
-}
-
-/*
- * Call the keyserver to obtain the decrypted conversation key and
- * UNIX creds. We use a Linux-specific keycall extension that does
- * both things in one go.
- */
-static struct des_cred *
-get_cred_byname(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 *authp, char *fullname, u32 *cryptkey)
-{
-	static int	in_keycall;
-	struct des_cred	*cred;
-
-	if (in_keycall) {
-		*authp = rpc_autherr_dropit;
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	in_keycall = 1;
-	in_keycall = 0;
-	return cred;
-}

-
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