Re: [PATCH] cifs: handle termination of cifs oplockd kernel thread
From: J. Bruce Fields
Date: Sat Apr 30 2005 - 09:54:21 EST
On Sat, Apr 30, 2005 at 08:28:27AM -0500, Steve French wrote:
> Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> >>>- network/userspace filesystems should be fine aswell
> >>They should, but again I wonder if NFS with all it's complexity is
> >>being careful enough with what it accepts from the server.
> That is the fun of trying to get our network filesystems up to the
> 20th century. There is at lot more work that has to be done here, but
> it is gradually improving. At least for cifs but probably for NFSv4
> (and possibly AFS) it is possible for the client to validate that the
> server is who it says it is, and both NFSv4 (actually the newer NFS
> RPC) and CIFS of course allow packet signing which helps, not sure if
> AFS allows packet signing.
None of this helps in the situation Miklos is considering, where the
attacker is a user on the client doing the mount. So presumably the
user gets to choose a server under his/her control, and all the
authentication does is prove to the user that s/he got the right server,
which doesn't protect the kernel at all.
The only defense is auditing the client code's handling of data it
receives from the server.
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