Re: [PATCH -mm 5/7] add user namespace

[Herbert Poetzl]

On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 09:46:01PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Cedric Le Goater <clg@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> 
> > This patch adds the user namespace.
> >
> > Basically, it allows a process to unshare its user_struct table,
> > resetting at the same time its own user_struct and all the
> > associated accounting.
> >
> > For the moment, the root_user is added to the new user namespace
> > when it is cloned. An alternative behavior would be to let the
> > system allocate a new user_struct(0) in each new user namespace.
> > However, these 0 users would not have the privileges of the
> > root_user and it would be necessary to work on the process
> > capabilities to give them some permissions.
> 
> It is completely the wrong thing for a the root_user to span multiple
> namespaces as you describe. It is important for uid 0 in other
> namespaces to not have the privileges of the root_user. That is half
> the point.
>
> Too many files in sysfs and proc don't require caps but instead simply
> limit things to uid 0. Having a separate uid 0 in the different
> namespaces instantly makes all of these files inaccessible, and keeps
> processes from doing something bad.

well, here I'd definitely prefer to fix up that 'broken'
entries by adding proper capability checks, and maybe
even a bunch of new capabilities (i.e. 64bit caps and
such) first, because IMHO the capability system is the
'proper' method to protect them in the first place

> To a filesystem a uid does not share a uid namespace with the
> only things that should be accessible are those things that are
> readable/writeable by everyone. Unless the filesystem has provisions
> for storing multiple uid namespaces not files should be able to be
> created. Think NFS root squash.

that's where file tagging as Linux-VServer does it can
be used to 'share' a partition between different guests
(and have separate disk limits and quotas)

best,
Herbert

> > Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Andrey Savochkin <saw@xxxxx>
> > Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Sam Vilain <sam.vilain@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > ---
> >  fs/ioprio.c               |    5 +
> >  include/linux/init_task.h |    2 
> >  include/linux/nsproxy.h   |    2 
> >  include/linux/sched.h     |    6 +-
> >  include/linux/user.h      |   45 +++++++++++++++
> >  init/Kconfig              |    8 ++
> >  kernel/nsproxy.c          |   15 ++++-
> >  kernel/sys.c              |    8 +-
> >  kernel/user.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> 
> This patch looks extremly incomplete.
> 
> Every comparison of a user id needs to compare the tuple
> (user namespace, user id) or it needs to compare struct users.
> 
> Ever comparison of a group id needs to compare the tuple
> (user namespace, group id) or it needs to compare struct users.
> 
> I think the key infrastructure needs to be looked at here as well.
> 
> There needs to be a user namespace association for mounted filesystems.
> 
> We need a discussion about how we handle map users from one user
> namespace to another, because without some form of mapping so many
> things become inaccessible that the system is almost useless.
> 
> I believe some of the key infrastructure which is roughly kerberos
> authentication tokens could be used for this purpose.
> 
> A user namespace is a big thing.  What I see here doesn't even
> seem to scratch the surface.
> 
> Eric
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