Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce file posix caps

From: Serge E. Hallyn
Date: Tue Nov 07 2006 - 11:43:48 EST


Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> On Tue, 2006-11-07 at 09:10 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> > > On Mon, 2006-11-06 at 21:45 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given
> > > > a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without
> > > > having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
> > >
> > > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > > > index b200b98..ea631ee 100644
> > > > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > > > @@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct den
> > > > extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
> > > > extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
> > > > extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
> > > > +extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
> > > > +extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
> > > > +extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
> > > > +extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
> > > > extern int cap_syslog (int type);
> > > > extern int cap_vm_enough_memory (long pages);
> > > >
> > > > @@ -2594,12 +2598,12 @@ static inline int security_task_setgroup
> > > >
> > > > static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> > > > {
> > > > - return 0;
> > > > + return cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > static inline int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
> > > > {
> > > > - return 0;
> > > > + return cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > static inline int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p)
> > >
> > > setscheduler change seems to be missing here.
> >
> > I'm confused - my kernel version already had selinux_task_setscheduler()
> > calling a secondary_ops->task_setscheduler().
>
> I meant you didn't change the default implementation of
> security_task_setscheduler() to call cap_task_setscheduler() in
> security.h. For the case where CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined.

Oh, I thought my git tree had gotten messed up.

So I guess that CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES should not be dependent
on CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES, since the !CONFIG_SECURITY case
actually enables capabilities?

-serge
-
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