Re: [RFC] TOMOYO Linux

[Toshiharu Harada]

2007/6/13, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
> On Wed, 2007-06-13 at 17:13 +0900, Toshiharu Harada wrote:
> > Here are examples:
> > /bin/bash process invoked from mingetty: /sbin/mingetty /bin/bash
> > /bin/bash process invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash
> > /bin/bash process invoked from /bin/bash which was invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /bin/bash
>
> Why can't you do this via SELinux domain transitions?  That lets you do
> it by equivalence class rather than per-binary, and let's you just
> encode the security-relevant parts of the "invocation history" aka call
> chain.  For example, the above could be expressed in SELinux policy
> already as:
>         domain_auto_trans(getty_t, shell_exec_t, local_shell_t)
>         domain_auto_trans(sshd_t, shell_exec_t, remote_shell_t)
>         domain_auto_trans(remote_shell_t, shell_exec_t, remote_subshell_t)
> or whatever you like.  But you don't have to keep extending it
> indefinitely when you don't need to distinguish in policy, so you might
> choose to entirely omit the last one, and just have it stay in
> remote_shell_t.

The above SELinux policy looks similar to the one I wrote, but
that is not very true.  Because in my example, path name corresponds to a file
while local_shell_t are bound to multiple.
I understand the advantages of label, but it needs to be
translated to human understandable form of path name.
So I think pathname based call chains are advantages for
at least auditing and profiling.

--
Toshiharu Harada
haradats@xxxxxxxxx
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