On Tue, Dec 04, 2007 at 07:17:58PM +0100, Eric Dumazet wrote:Alan Cox a ?crit :Yes, since current behavior on network irq is very pessimistic.No matter what you consider as being better, changing a 12 years old and widely used userspace interface like /dev/urandom is simply not an option.Fixing it to be more efficient in its use of entropy and also fixing the
fact its not actually a good random number source would be worth looking
at however.
No, it's very optimistic. The network should not be trusted.
The distinction between /dev/random and /dev/urandom boils down to one
word: paranoia. If you are not paranoid enough to mistrust your
network, then /dev/random IS NOT FOR YOU. Use /dev/urandom. Do not
send patches to make /dev/random less paranoid, kthxbye.
If you have some trafic, (ie more than HZ/2 interrupts per second), then add_timer_randomness() feeds
some entropy but gives no credit (calling credit_entropy_store() with nbits=0)
This is because we take into account only the jiffies difference, and not the get_cycles() that should give
us more entropy on most plaforms.
If we cannot measure a difference, we should nonetheless assume there
is one?
In this patch, I suggest that we feed only one u32 word of entropy, combination of the previous distinct
words (with some of them being constant or so), so that the nbits estimation is less pessimistic, but also to
avoid injecting false entropy.
Umm.. no, that's not how it works at all.
Also, for future reference, patches for /dev/random go through me, not
through Dave.