Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup

[Stephen Smalley]

On Wed, 2008-03-12 at 08:09 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Pavel Emelyanov (xemul@xxxxxxxxxx):
> > Greg KH wrote:
> > > On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 12:57:55PM +0300, Pavel Emelyanov wrote:
> > >> Besides, I've measured some things - the lat_syscall test for open from 
> > >> lmbench test suite and the nptl perf test. Here are the results:
> > >>
> > >>         sec     nosec
> > >> open    3.0980s  3.0709s
> > >> nptl    2.7746s  2.7710s
> > >>
> > >> So we have 0.88% loss in open and ~0.15% with nptl. I know, this is not that
> > >> much, but it is noticeable. Besides, this is only two tests, digging deeper
> > >> may reveal more.
> > > 
> > > I think that is in the noise of sampling if you run that test many more
> > > times.
> > 
> > These numbers are average values of 20 runs of each test. I didn't
> > provide the measurement accuracy, but the abs(open.sec - open.nosec)
> > is greater than it.
> > 
> > >> Let alone the fact that simply turning the CONFIG_SECURITY to 'y' puts +8Kb 
> > >> to the vmlinux...
> > >>
> > >> I think, I finally agree with you and Al Viro, that the kobj mapper is 
> > >> not the right place to put the filtering, but taking the above numbers 
> > >> into account, can we put the "hooks" into the #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> > >> versions of security_inode_permission/security_file_permission/etc?
> > > 
> > > Ask the security module interface maintainers about this, not me :)
> > 
> > OK :) Thanks for your time, Greg.
> > 
> > So, Serge, since you already have a LSM-based version, maybe you can
> > change it with the proposed "fix" and send it to LSM maintainers for
> > review?
> 
> To take the point of view of someone who neither wants containers nor
> LSM but just a fast box,
> 
> you're asking me to introduce LSM hooks for the !SECURITY case?  :)
> 
> I can give it a shot, but I expect some complaints.  Now at least the
> _mknod hook shouldn't be a hotpath,  and I suppose I can add yet
> an #ifdef inside the !SECURITY version of security_inode_permission().
> I still expect some complaints though.  I'll send something soon.

Not sure I'm following the plot here, but please don't do anything that
will prohibit the use of containers/namespaces with security modules
like SELinux/Smack.  Yes, that's a legitimate use case, and there will
be people who will want to do that - they serve different but
complementary purposes (containers are _not_ a substitute for MAC).  We
don't want them to be exclusive of one another.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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