[PATCH] crypto: fix up checkpatch errors
From: Neil Horman
Date: Tue Jul 15 2008 - 11:30:25 EST
Patch to clean up the checkpatch errors in crypto/prng.c
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
prng.c | 155 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
1 file changed, 85 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/prng.c b/crypto/prng.c
index 24e4f32..11b9306 100644
--- a/crypto/prng.c
+++ b/crypto/prng.c
@@ -81,14 +81,17 @@ static void hexdump(char *note, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
}
}
-#define dbgprint(format, args...) do {if(dbg) printk(format, ##args);} while(0)
+#define dbgprint(format, args...) do {\
+if (dbg)\
+ printk(format, ##args);\
+} while (0)
static void xor_vectors(unsigned char *in1, unsigned char *in2,
- unsigned char *out, unsigned int size)
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned int size)
{
int i;
- for (i=0;i<size;i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i];
}
@@ -108,7 +111,8 @@ static int _get_more_prng_bytes(struct prng_context *ctx)
desc.flags = 0;
- dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Calling _get_more_prng_bytes for context %p\n",ctx);
+ dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Calling _get_more_prng_bytes for context %p\n",
+ ctx);
hexdump("Input DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
hexdump("Input I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
@@ -117,63 +121,70 @@ static int _get_more_prng_bytes(struct prng_context *ctx)
/*
* This algorithm is a 3 stage state machine
*/
- for (i=0;i<3;i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
desc.tfm = ctx->tfm;
desc.flags = 0;
switch (i) {
- case 0:
- /*
- * Start by encrypting the counter value
- * This gives us an intermediate value I
- */
- memcpy(tmp, ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- sg_init_one(&sg_out, &ctx->I[0], DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- hexdump("tmp stage 0: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- break;
- case 1:
-
- /*
- * Next xor I with our secret vector V
- * encrypt that result to obtain our
- * pseudo random data which we output
- */
- xor_vectors(ctx->I, ctx->V, tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- sg_init_one(&sg_out, &ctx->rand_data[0], DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- hexdump("tmp stage 1: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- break;
- case 2:
- /*
- * First check that we didn't produce the same random data
- * that we did last time around through this
- */
- if (!memcmp(ctx->rand_data, ctx->last_rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "ctx %p Failed repetition check!\n",
- ctx);
- ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(ctx->last_rand_data, ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-
- /*
- * Lastly xor the random data with I
- * and encrypt that to obtain a new secret vector V
- */
- xor_vectors(ctx->rand_data, ctx->I, tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- sg_init_one(&sg_out, &ctx->V[0], DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- hexdump("tmp stage 2: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- break;
+ case 0:
+ /*
+ * Start by encrypting the counter value
+ * This gives us an intermediate value I
+ */
+ memcpy(tmp, ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ sg_init_one(&sg_out, &ctx->I[0], DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ hexdump("tmp stage 0: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ break;
+ case 1:
+
+ /*
+ * Next xor I with our secret vector V
+ * encrypt that result to obtain our
+ * pseudo random data which we output
+ */
+ xor_vectors(ctx->I, ctx->V, tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ sg_init_one(&sg_out, &ctx->rand_data[0],
+ DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ hexdump("tmp stage 1: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ /*
+ * First check that we didn't produce the same
+ * random data that we did last time around through this
+ */
+ if (!memcmp(ctx->rand_data, ctx->last_rand_data,
+ DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "ctx %p Failed repetition check!\n",
+ ctx);
+ ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(ctx->last_rand_data, ctx->rand_data,
+ DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+
+ /*
+ * Lastly xor the random data with I
+ * and encrypt that to obtain a new secret vector V
+ */
+ xor_vectors(ctx->rand_data, ctx->I, tmp,
+ DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ sg_init_one(&sg_out, &ctx->V[0], DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ hexdump("tmp stage 2: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ break;
}
/* Initialize our input buffer */
sg_init_one(&sg_in, &tmp[0], DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
/* do the encryption */
- ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg_out, &sg_in, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg_out, &sg_in,
+ DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
/* And check the result */
if (ret) {
- dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Encryption of new block failed for context %p\n",ctx);
+ dbgprint(KERN_CRIT
+ "Crypt of block failed for context %p\n", ctx);
ctx->rand_data_valid = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
return -1;
}
@@ -183,12 +194,11 @@ static int _get_more_prng_bytes(struct prng_context *ctx)
/*
* Now update our DT value
*/
- for (i=DEFAULT_BLK_SZ-1;i>0;i--) {
+ for (i = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ-1; i > 0; i--)
ctx->DT[i] = ctx->DT[i-1];
- }
ctx->DT[0] += 1;
- dbgprint("Returning new block for context %p\n",ctx);
+ dbgprint("Returning new block for context %p\n", ctx);
ctx->rand_data_valid = 0;
hexdump("Output DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
@@ -230,7 +240,8 @@ int get_prng_bytes(char *buf, int nbytes, struct prng_context *ctx)
err = byte_count;
- dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "getting %d random bytes for context %p\n",byte_count, ctx);
+ dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "getting %d random bytes for context %p\n",
+ byte_count, ctx);
remainder:
@@ -246,7 +257,8 @@ remainder:
* Copy up to the next whole block size
*/
if (byte_count < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
- for (;ctx->rand_data_valid < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; ctx->rand_data_valid++) {
+ for (; ctx->rand_data_valid < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
+ ctx->rand_data_valid++) {
*ptr = ctx->rand_data[ctx->rand_data_valid];
ptr++;
byte_count--;
@@ -258,7 +270,7 @@ remainder:
/*
* Now copy whole blocks
*/
- for(;byte_count >= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; byte_count -= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
+ for (; byte_count >= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; byte_count -= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx) < 0) {
memset(buf, 0, nbytes);
err = -1;
@@ -277,14 +289,16 @@ remainder:
done:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->prng_lock, flags);
- dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "returning %d from get_prng_bytes in context %p\n",err, ctx);
+ dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "returning %d from get_prng_bytes in context %p\n",
+ err, ctx);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_prng_bytes);
struct prng_context *alloc_prng_context(void)
{
- struct prng_context *ctx=kzalloc(sizeof(struct prng_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ struct prng_context *ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct prng_context),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
spin_lock_init(&ctx->prng_lock);
@@ -293,10 +307,9 @@ struct prng_context *alloc_prng_context(void)
ctx = NULL;
}
- dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "returning context %p\n",ctx);
+ dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "returning context %p\n", ctx);
return ctx;
}
-
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alloc_prng_context);
void free_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx)
@@ -318,40 +331,42 @@ int reset_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx,
ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
if (key)
- memcpy(ctx->prng_key,key,strlen(ctx->prng_key));
+ memcpy(ctx->prng_key, key, strlen(ctx->prng_key));
else
ctx->prng_key = DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY;
if (iv)
- memcpy(ctx->prng_iv,iv, strlen(ctx->prng_iv));
+ memcpy(ctx->prng_iv, iv, strlen(ctx->prng_iv));
else
ctx->prng_iv = DEFAULT_PRNG_IV;
if (V)
- memcpy(ctx->V,V,DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ memcpy(ctx->V, V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
else
- memcpy(ctx->V,DEFAULT_V_SEED,DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ memcpy(ctx->V, DEFAULT_V_SEED, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
if (DT)
memcpy(ctx->DT, DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
else
memset(ctx->DT, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- memset(ctx->rand_data,0,DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
- memset(ctx->last_rand_data,0,DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ memset(ctx->rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
+ memset(ctx->last_rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
if (ctx->tfm)
crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->tfm);
- ctx->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("rfc3686(ctr(aes))",0,0);
+ ctx->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("rfc3686(ctr(aes))", 0, 0);
if (!ctx->tfm) {
- dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Failed to alloc crypto tfm for context %p\n",ctx->tfm);
+ dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Failed to alloc tfm for context %p\n",
+ ctx->tfm);
goto out;
}
ctx->rand_data_valid = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
- ret = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ctx->tfm, ctx->prng_key, strlen(ctx->prng_key));
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ctx->tfm, ctx->prng_key,
+ strlen(ctx->prng_key));
if (ret) {
dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "PRNG: setkey() failed flags=%x\n",
crypto_blkcipher_get_flags(ctx->tfm));
@@ -360,9 +375,9 @@ int reset_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx,
}
iv_len = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(ctx->tfm);
- if (iv_len) {
+ if (iv_len)
crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(ctx->tfm, ctx->prng_iv, iv_len);
- }
+
rc = 0;
ctx->flags &= ~PRNG_NEED_RESET;
out:
@@ -384,7 +399,7 @@ static int __init prng_mod_init(void)
struct prng_context *ctx = alloc_prng_context();
if (ctx == NULL)
return -EFAULT;
- for (i=0;i<16;i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
if (get_prng_bytes(tmpbuf, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ, ctx) < 0) {
free_prng_context(ctx);
return -EFAULT;
--
/****************************************************
* Neil Horman <nhorman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
* Software Engineer, Red Hat
****************************************************/
--
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