Re: [stable] Linux 2.6.25.10 (resume)
From: Rodrigo Rubira Branco (BSDaemon)
Date: Mon Jul 21 2008 - 21:11:47 EST
Al Viro escreveu:
On Sat, Jul 19, 2008 at 03:13:43PM -0700, Greg KH wrote:
I disagree with this and feel that our current policy of fixing bugs and
releasing full code is pretty much the same thing as we are doing today,
although I can understand the confusion. How about this rewording of
the sentance instead:
We prefer to fix and provide an update for the bug as soon as
possible.
So a simple 1 line change should be enough to stem this kind of argument
in the future, right?
Not quite... OK, here's a story that might serve as a model
of all that crap - it certainly runs afoul of a bunch of arguments on
all sides of that.
Ual, crap? :-)
We all know that POSIX locks suck by design, in particular where it
deals with close(2) semantics. "$FOO is associated with process P having
a descriptor refering to opened file F, $FOO disappears when any of such
descriptors get removed" is bloody inconvenient in a lot of respects. It
also turns out to invite very similar kind of wrong assumptions in all
implementation that have to deal with descriptor tables being possibly
shared. So far the victims include:
* FreeBSD POSIX locks; used to be vulnerable, fixed.
* OpenBSD POSIX locks; vulnerable.
* Linux POSIX locks and dnotify entries; used to be vulnerable, fixed.
Plan9 happily avoids having these turds in the first place and IIRC NetBSD
simply doesn't have means for sharing descriptor tables. Should such means
appear it would be vulnerable as well. Dnotify is Linux-only, er, entity
(as in "non sunt multiplicandam"). I haven't looked at Solaris and I couldn't
care less about GNU Turd.
In all cases vulnerablities are local, with impact ranging from
user-triggered panic to rather unpleasant privelege escalations (e.g.
"any user can send an arbitrary signal to arbitrary process" in case of
dnotify, etc.)
The nature of mistaken assumption is exactly the same in all cases.
An object is associated with vnode/dentry/inode/whatnot and since it's
destroyed on any close(), it is assumed that we shall be guaranteed that
such objects will not be able to outlive the opened file they are associated
with or the process creating them. It leads to the following nastiness:
A and B share descriptor table.
A: fcntl(fd, ...) trying to create such object; it resolves descriptor to
opened file, pins it down for the duration of operation and blocks
somewhere in course of creating the object.
B: close(fd) evicts opened file from descriptor table. It finds no objects
to be destroyed.
A: completes creation of object, associates it with filesystem object and
releases the temporary hold it had on opened file.
At that point we have an obvious leak and slightly less obvious attack vector.
If no other descriptors in the descriptor table of A and B used to refer to
the same file, the object will not be destroyed since there will be nothing
that could decide to destroy it. Unfortunately, it's worse than just a leak.
These objects are supposed to be destroyed before the end of life of opened
file. As the result, nobody bothers to have them affect refcounts on the
file/vnode/dentry/inode/whatever. That's perfectly fine - the proper fix is
to have fcntl() verify that descriptor still resolves to the same file before
completing its work and destroy the object if it doesn't. You don't need to
play with refcounts for that. However, without that fix we have a leak that
leads to more than just an undead object - it's an undead object containing
references to filesystem object that might be reused and to task_struct/proc/
whatever you call it, again with the possibility of reuse.
Getting from that point to the attack is a matter of simple (really simple)
RTFS. Details obviously depend on what the kernel in question is doing to
these objects, but with that kind of broken assertions it's really not hard
to come up with exploitable holes.
Now, let us look at the history:
* POSIX locks support predates shared descriptor tables; the holes
in question opened as soon as clone(2)/rfork(2) had been merged into a kernel
and grown support for shared descriptor tables. For Linux it's 1.3.22 (Sep
1995), for OpenBSD it's a bit before 2.0 (Jan 1996) for FreeBSD - 2.2 (Feb
1996, from OpenBSD).
* In 2002 dnotify had grown the same semantics (Linux-only thing,
2.5.15, soon backported to 2.4.19). Same kind of race.
* In 2003 FreeBSD folks had found and fixed their instance of that bug;
commit message:
"Avoid file lock leakage when linuxthreads port or rfork is used:
- Mark the process leader as having an advisory lock
- Check if process leader is marked as having advisory lock when
closing file
- Check that file is still open after lock has been obtained
- Don't allow file descriptor table sharing between processes
with different leaders"
"Check that file is still open" bit refers to that race. I have no idea
whether they'd realized that what they'd closed had been locally exploitable
or not.
* In 2005 Peter Staubach had noticed the Linux analog of that sucker.
The fix had been along the same lines as FreeBSD one, but in case of Linux
we had extra fun with SMP ordering. Peter had missed that and his patch
left a hard to hit remnant of the race. His commit message is rather long;
it starts with
[PATCH] stale POSIX lock handling
I believe that there is a problem with the handling of POSIX locks, which
the attached patch should address.
The problem appears to be a race between fcntl(2) and close(2). A
multithreaded application could close a file descriptor at the same time as
it is trying to acquire a lock using the same file descriptor. I would
suggest that that multithreaded application is not providing the proper
synchronization for itself, but the OS should still behave correctly.
...
I'm 100% sure that in this case the vulnerability had _not_ been realized.
Bogus behaviour had been noticed and (mostly) fixed, but implications had
been missed, along with the fact that the same scenario had played out in
dnotify.
That's common... We know that will occur from time to time and we are
not discussing about that... Just about already known security issues
being silently fixed without any mention.
* This April I'd caught dnotify hole during code audit. The fix
had been trivial enough and seeing that impact had been fairly nasty (any
user could send any signal to any process, among other things) I'd decided
to play along with "proper mechanisms". Meaning vendor-sec. _Bad_ error
in judgement; the damn thing had not improved since I'd unsubscribed from
that abortion. A trivial patch, obviously local to one function and obviously
not modifying behaviour other than in case when existing tree would've screwed
itself. Not affecting any headers. Not affecting any data structures.
_Obviously_ not affecting any 3rd-party code - not even on binary level.
IOW, as safe as it ever gets.
Alas. The usual shite had played out and we had a *MONTH-LONG*
embargo. I would like to use this opportunity to offer a whole-hearted
"fuck you" to that lovely practice and to vendor-sec in general.
huahuahuahuahuhuahuahu, tks for share your felling about that... Maybe
the wrong people are dealing with that... What do you think?
* Very soon after writing the first version of a fix I started
wondering if POSIX locks had the same hole - the same kind of semantics
had invited the same kind of race there (eviction of dnotify entries and
eviction of POSIX locks are called in the same place in close(2)). Current
tree appeared to be OK, checking the history had shown Peter's patch.
A bit after that I'd noticed insufficient locking in dnotify patch, fixed
that. Checking for similar problems in POSIX locks counterpart of that crap
had found the SMP ordering bug that remained there.
* 2.6 -> 2.4 backport had uncovered another interesting thing -
Peter's patch did _not_ make it to 2.4 3 years ago.
* Checking OpenBSD (only now - I didn't get around to that back in
April) shows that the same hole is alive and well there.
Note that
* OpenBSD folks hadn't picked the fix from FreeBSD ones, even though
the FreeBSD version had been derived from OpenBSD one. Why? At a guess, the
commit message had been less than noticable. Feel free to toss yourself off
screaming "coverup" if you are so inclined; I don't swing that way...
I ever used this word... I know others did anyway.
* Initial Linux fix _definitely_ had missed security implications
*and* realization that somebody else might suffer from the same problem.
FVO "somebody" including Linux itself, not to mention *BSD.
That's the main problem of 'hidden' security bugs... Hidden here must be
understood as: normal bugs = security bugs
* Even when the problem had been realized for what it had been in
Linux, *BSD potential issues hadn't registered. Again, the same wunch
of bankers is welcome to scream "coverup", but in this case we even have
the bleeding CVEs.
* CVEs or no CVEs, OpenBSD folks hadn't picked that one.
Yeah, they don't pay much attention to other projects I they should...
That's why I always talk about 'copy and paste security bugs' as a real
problem in open-source projects... Because the original code may be
fixed and the 'copied' one not ;)
* Going to vendor-sec is a mistake I won't repeat any time soon and
I would strongly recommend everybody else to stay the hell away from that
morass. It creates inexcusable delays, bounds you to confidentiality and,
Interesting... every people involved in this discussion told us to
change our behaviour and try to improve things instead of be against
it... Why not change people involved in the vendor-sec in some way? I
have no idea who are there, but I'm sure it can be improved since I
already worked with many vendors to coordinate vuln-disclousure and had
no problems.
I'm sure the vendors involved are caring about 'marketing' and things
like that, that's why there is a delay... They need to learn from others
mistakes, like Microsoft. The company now really knows how to deal with
security problems.
let's face it, happens to be the prime infiltration target for zero-day
exploit traders. In _this_ case exploit had been local-only. Anything more
interesting...
That's true. Mainly because it takes longer to have a fix... I agree
with the fix asap idea, just don't agree with 'change the message in the
patch to not apper to be a security bug been fixed'.
So where does that leave us? Bugger if I know... FWIW, I would rather see
implications thought about *and* mentioned in the changelogs. OTOH, the
above shows the real-world cases when breakage hadn't even been realized to
be security-significant.
We ever said it's different otherwise...
Obviously broken behaviour (leak, for example)
gets spotted and fixed. Fix looks obviously sane, bug it deals with -
obviously real and worth fixing, so into a tree it goes... IOW, one _can't_
rely on having patches that close security holes marked as such.
Sometimes no one will figure out that patch closed a security issue...
We are talking in this thread about patches that are well-known to fix
security holes... As the bugzilla explicitly says about a security
problem and in the commit nothing mention that.
For that
the authors have to notice that themselves in the first place. OTTH, nothing
is going to convince the target audience of grsec, er, gentlemen that we are
not a massive conspiracy anyway, the tinfoil brigade being what it is...
There is no target audience involved here... There is no 'marketing' or
'media circus'... It's just a try to improve things.
cya,
Rodrigo (BSDaemon).
PS: Just my personal thoughts, not related to the company that I work for.
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