[patch 30/47] exec: fix stack excutability without PT_GNU_STACK

[Greg KH]

2.6.25-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us
know.

------------------
From: Hugh Dickins <hugh@xxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 96a8e13ed44e380fc2bb6c711d74d5ba698c00b2 upstream

Kernel Bugzilla #11063 points out that on some architectures (e.g. x86_32)
exec'ing an ELF without a PT_GNU_STACK program header should default to an
executable stack; but this got broken by the unlimited argv feature because
stack vma is now created before the right personality has been established:
so breaking old binaries using nested function trampolines.

Therefore re-evaluate VM_STACK_FLAGS in setup_arg_pages, where stack
vm_flags used to be set, before the mprotect_fixup.  Checking through
our existing VM_flags, none would have changed since insert_vm_struct:
so this seems safer than finding a way through the personality labyrinth.

Reported-by: pageexec@xxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxx>

---
 fs/exec.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm 
 	bprm->exec -= stack_shift;
 
 	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
-	vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
+	vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
 
 	/*
 	 * Adjust stack execute permissions; explicitly enable for

-- 
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