Re: [patch] Add basic sanity checks to the syscall execution patch

[pageexec]

On 4 Sep 2008 at 5:44, Arjan van de Ven wrote:

> On Thu, 04 Sep 2008 14:01:46 +0200
> Andi Kleen <andi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> > Arjan van de Ven <arjan@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> > 
> > > Add basic sanity checks to the syscall execution patch
> > 
> > This just means that the root kits will switch to patch
> > the first instruction of the entry points instead.
> > 
> > So the protection will be zero to minimal, but the overhead will
> > be there forever.
> > 
> > Now that I said this I expect it to go in yesterday.
> >
> 
> I'd have considered taking your email serious if you had left out the
> uncalled and unneeded sarcasm line at the end.

consider how your whole patch is based on one big self-contradiction.
you already assume that the attacker *can* modify arbitrary kernel memory
(even the otherwise *read-only* syscall table at that), but at the very
same time you're saying he *can't* use the same powers to patch out your
'protection' or do many other things to evade it. as it is, it's cargo cult
security at its best, reminding one on the Vista kernel's similar 'protection' 
mechanism for the service descriptor tables...

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