Re: [PATCH -v1 1/3] SECURITY: new capable_noaudit interface

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@xxxxxxxxxx):
> Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to
> make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision.  Currently
> this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use
> the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom
> algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less
> likely to be killed.  These types of security system requests should not be
> audited or logged since they are not really security decisions.  It would be
> possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did
> by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that
> interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex
> indirection.
> 
> This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not
> flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx>

Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1.
I.e.

#define CAP_NOAUDIT 0
#define CAP_AUDIT 1

Otherwise, looks fine.

thanks,
-serge
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/