Re: [RFC] tcp: race in receive part

From: Eric Dumazet
Date: Tue Jun 23 2009 - 06:33:23 EST


Jiri Olsa a Ãcrit :
> Hi,
>
> thanks for an answer, and sorry for my late reply,
> we needed the cust permission to disclose the debug data.
>

I see ! Now this is me with litle time as I am traveling right now.

>
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2009 at 04:06:42PM +0200, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>> Jiri Olsa a Ãcrit :
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> in RHEL4 we can see a race in the tcp layer. We were not able to reproduce
>>> this on the upstream kernel, but since the issue occurs very rarelly
>>> (once per 8 days), we just might not be lucky.
>>>
>>> I'm affraid this might be a long email, I'll try to structure it nicely.. :)
>>>
>> Thanks for your mail and detailed analysis
>>
>>>
>>> RACE DESCRIPTION
>>> ================
>>>
>>> There's a nice pdf describing the issue (and sollution using locks) on
>>> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=345014
>> I could not reach this url unfortunatly
>>
>> --> "You are not authorized to access bug #494404. "
>
> please try it now, the bug should be accessible now
>

Thanks, this doc is indeed nice :)

But adding an write_lock()/write_unlock() in tcp_poll() was overkill
It had an sm_mb() implied because of the nesting of locks.

>>>
>>> The race fires, when following code paths meet, and the tp->rcv_nxt and
>>> __add_wait_queue updates stay in CPU caches.
>>>
>>> CPU1 CPU2
>>>
>>>
>>> sys_select receive packet
>>> ... ...
>>> __add_wait_queue update tp->rcv_nxt
>>> ... ...
>>> tp->rcv_nxt check sock_def_readable
>>> ... {
>>> schedule ...
>>> if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep))
>>> wake_up_interruptible(sk->sk_sleep)
>>> ...
>>> }
>>>
>>> If there were no cache the code would work ok, since the wait_queue and
>>> rcv_nxt are opposit to each other.
>>>
>>> Meaning that once tp->rcv_nxt is updated by CPU2, the CPU1 either already
>>> passed the tp->rcv_nxt check and sleeps, or will get the new value for
>>> tp->rcv_nxt and will return with new data mask.
>>> In both cases the process (CPU1) is being added to the wait queue, so the
>>> waitqueue_active (CPU2) call cannot miss and will wake up CPU1.
>>>
>>> The bad case is when the __add_wait_queue changes done by CPU1 stay in its
>>> cache , and so does the tp->rcv_nxt update on CPU2 side. The CPU1 will then
>>> endup calling schedule and sleep forever if there are no more data on the
>>> socket.
>>>
>>> Adding smp_mb() calls before sock_def_readable call and after __add_wait_queue
>>> should prevent the above bad scenario.
>>>
>>> The upstream patch is attached. It seems to prevent the issue.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> CPU BUGS
>>> ========
>>>
>>> The customer has been able to reproduce this problem only on one CPU model:
>>> Xeon E5345*2. They didn't reproduce on XEON MV, for example.
>> Is there an easy way to reproduce the problem ?
>
> there's a reproducer attached to the bug
>
> https://enterprise.redhat.com/issue-tracker/?module=download&fid=201560&key=f6f87caf6ac2dc1eb1173257c8a5ef78
>
> it is basically the client/server program.
> They're passing messages to each other. When a message is sent,
> both of them expect message on the input before sending another message.
>
> Very rarely the code hits the place when the process which called select
> is not woken up by incomming data. Probably because of the memory cache
> incoherency. See backtrace in the
>
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=494404#c1
>
>
>>> That CPU model happens to have 2 possible issues, that might cause the issue:
>>> (see errata http://www.intel.com/Assets/PDF/specupdate/315338.pdf)
>>>
>>> AJ39 and AJ18. The first one can be workarounded by BIOS upgrade,
>>> the other one has following notes:
>> AJ18 only matters on unaligned accesses, tcp code doesnt do this.
>>
>>> Software should ensure at least one of the following is true when
>>> modifying shared data by multiple agents:
>>> â The shared data is aligned
>>> â Proper semaphores or barriers are used in order to
>>> prevent concurrent data accesses.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> RFC
>>> ===
>>>
>>> I'm aware that not having this issue reproduced on upstream lowers the odds
>>> having this checked in. However AFAICS the issue is present. I'd appreciate
>>> any comment/ideas.
>>>
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> jirka
>>>
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>
>>> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
>>> index 17b89c5..f5d9dbf 100644
>>> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
>>> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
>>> @@ -340,6 +340,11 @@ unsigned int tcp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait)
>>> struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
>>>
>>> poll_wait(file, sk->sk_sleep, wait);
>> poll_wait() calls add_wait_queue() which contains a
>> spin_lock_irqsave()/spin_unlock_irqrestore() pair
>>
>> Documentation/memory-barriers.txt states in line 1123 :
>>
>> Memory operations issued after the LOCK will be completed after the LOCK
>> operation has completed.
>>
>> and line 1131 states :
>>
>> Memory operations issued before the UNLOCK will be completed before the
>> UNLOCK operation has completed.
>>
>> So yes, there is no full smp_mb() in poll_wait()
>>
>>> +
>>> + /* Get in sync with tcp_data_queue, tcp_urg
>>> + and tcp_rcv_established function. */
>>> + smp_mb();
>> If this barrier is really necessary, I guess it should be done in poll_wait() itself.
>>
>> Documentation/memory-barriers.txt misses some information about poll_wait()
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> +
>>> if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
>>> return inet_csk_listen_poll(sk);
>>>
>>> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
>>> index 2bdb0da..0606e5e 100644
>>> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
>>> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
>>> @@ -4362,8 +4362,11 @@ queue_and_out:
>>>
>>> if (eaten > 0)
>>> __kfree_skb(skb);
>>> - else if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
>>> + else if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
>>> + /* Get in sync with tcp_poll function. */
>>> + smp_mb();
>>> sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
>>> + }
>>> return;
>>>
>> Oh well... if smp_mb() is needed, I believe it should be done
>> right before "if (waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep) ... "
>>
>> read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
>> + smp_mb();
>> if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep))
>> wake_up_interruptible(sk->sk_sleep)
>>
>> It would match other parts in kernel (see fs/splice.c, fs/aio.c, ...)
>>
>> Strange thing is that read_lock() on x86 is a full memory barrier, as it uses
>> "lock subl $0x1,(%eax)"
>>
>> Maybe we could define a smp_mb_after_read_lock() (a compiler barrier() on x86)
>>
>
> First version of the patch was actually in this layer, see
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=345886
>
> I was adviced this could be to invasive (it was in waitqueue_active actually),
> so I moved the change to the TCP layer itself...
>
> As far as I understand the problem there's need for 2 barriers to be
> sure, the memory will have correct data. One in the codepath calling the
> select (tcp_poll), and in the other one updating the available data status
> (sock_def_readable), am I missing smth?
>

Hmm, I am not saying your patch doesnt fix the problem, I am saying it
is a partial fix of a general problem. We might have same problem(s) in other
parts of network stack. This is a very serious issue.

Point 1 :

You added an smp_mb() call in tcp_poll(). This one looks fine to solve
the problem for tcp sockets. What about other protocols ? Do we have
same problem ?

Point 2 :

You added several smp_mb() calls in tcp input path. In my first
reply, I said it was probably better to add smp_mb() in a single
place, right before "if (waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep) ... ",
but in all paths (input path & output path).

Point 3 :

The optimization we could do, defining
a smp_mb_after_read_lock() that could be a nop on x86

read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); // "lock subl $0x1,(%eax)" on x86
smp_mb_after_read_lock(); /* compiler barrier() on x86 */
if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep))
wake_up_interruptible(sk->sk_sleep);

Am I missing something ?

;)

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