Re: security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check

[James Morris]

This has now been applied to

Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next


On Thu, 7 May 2009, James Morris wrote:

> On Thu, 7 May 2009, Chris Wright wrote:
> 
> > * Ingo Molnar (mingo@xxxxxxx) wrote:
> 
> [Added LSM list to the CC; please do so whenever making changes in this 
> area...]
> 
> > > They have no active connection to the core kernel 
> > > ptrace_may_access() check in any case:
> > 
> > Not sure what you mean:
> > 
> > ptrace_may_access
> >  __ptrace_may_access
> >   security_ptrace_may_access
> > 
> > Looks like your patch won't compile.
> > 
> 
> Below is an updated version which fixes the bug, against 
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next
> 
> Boot tested with SELinux.
> 
> commit c4c79671177dc3e8387c337f75f3c664cdf08838
> Author: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxx>
> Date:   Thu May 7 19:26:19 2009 +1000
> 
>     security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check
>     
>     The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real
>     ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have
>     a retval convention.
>     
>     Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.
>     
>     [ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]
>     
>     Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxx>
>     Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 54ed157..0147def 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
>  extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
>  		       int cap, int audit);
>  extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
> -extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> +extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
>  extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
>  extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
>  extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> @@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
>   *	@alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   *
> - * @ptrace_may_access:
> + * @ptrace_access_check:
>   *	Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
>   *	@child process.
>   *	Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
> @@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
>   *	Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
>   *	current process before allowing the current process to present itself
>   *	to the @parent process for tracing.
> - *	The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_may_access
> + *	The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check
>   *	checks before it is allowed to trace this one.
>   *	@parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
>  struct security_operations {
>  	char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
>  
> -	int (*ptrace_may_access) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> +	int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
>  	int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
>  	int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
>  		       kernel_cap_t *effective,
> @@ -1616,7 +1616,7 @@ extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
>  extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
>  
>  /* Security operations */
> -int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> +int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
>  int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
>  int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
>  		    kernel_cap_t *effective,
> @@ -1797,10 +1797,10 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
> +static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
>  					     unsigned int mode)
>  {
> -	return cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
> +	return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
>  }
>  
>  static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> index c9cf48b..284d0ac 100644
> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
>  	if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
> -	return security_ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
> +	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
>  }
>  
>  bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
> index 21b6cea..f218dd3 100644
> --- a/security/capability.c
> +++ b/security/capability.c
> @@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
>  
>  void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
>  {
> -	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 97ac1f1..e57611a 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
> + * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
>   *			   another
>   * @child: The process to be accessed
>   * @mode: The mode of attachment.
> @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
>   * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
>   * granted, -ve if denied.
>   */
> -int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> +int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
>  {
>  	int ret = 0;
>  
> diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
> index 40fb4f1..e8d5861 100644
> --- a/security/root_plug.c
> +++ b/security/root_plug.c
> @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  
>  static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
>  	/* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
> -	.ptrace_may_access =		cap_ptrace_may_access,
> +	.ptrace_access_check =		cap_ptrace_access_check,
>  	.ptrace_traceme =		cap_ptrace_traceme,
>  	.capget =			cap_capget,
>  	.capset =			cap_capset,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 206e538..a3e6918 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
>  
>  /* Security operations */
>  
> -int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> +int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
>  {
> -	return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
> +	return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
>  }
>  
>  int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 39046dd..e30c4bb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1854,12 +1854,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
>  
>  /* Hook functions begin here. */
>  
> -static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
> +static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
>  				     unsigned int mode)
>  {
>  	int rc;
>  
> -	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
> +	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
>  	if (rc)
>  		return rc;
>  
> @@ -5310,7 +5310,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>  static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
>  	.name =				"selinux",
>  
> -	.ptrace_may_access =		selinux_ptrace_may_access,
> +	.ptrace_access_check =		selinux_ptrace_access_check,
>  	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
>  	.capget =			selinux_capget,
>  	.capset =			selinux_capset,
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index f557767..79949f9 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
>   */
>  
>  /**
> - * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
> + * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
>   * @ctp: child task pointer
>   * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
>   *
> @@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
>   *
>   * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
>   */
> -static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
> +static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
>  {
>  	int rc;
>  	struct smk_audit_info ad;
>  	char *sp, *tsp;
>  
> -	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
> +	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
>  	if (rc != 0)
>  		return rc;
>  
> @@ -3031,7 +3031,7 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>  struct security_operations smack_ops = {
>  	.name =				"smack",
>  
> -	.ptrace_may_access =		smack_ptrace_may_access,
> +	.ptrace_access_check =		smack_ptrace_access_check,
>  	.ptrace_traceme =		smack_ptrace_traceme,
>  	.capget = 			cap_capget,
>  	.capset = 			cap_capset,
> --
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-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
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