Also, fixing this is a non-backward-compatible change which could break
existing userspace. Although the chances of this seem fairly small.
Or are they? One could imagine a script which was tested and developed
on a 64-bit system, which writes a >4G number into a pseudo file. That
script happens to work on 32-bit systems (it might not work _well_, but
it'll work). With this change, the write will fail on the 32-bit
system and the entire application could bale out or something.
I'm not saying that this is a reason to avoid making the change, but
it's all a worry and needs consideration.
The other worrisome thing about this change is that there may well be
existing userspace which does
echo 42foo > /proc/whatever
and the conversion to strict_strtoul() will cause that script to
newly fail.
And the chances that there are scripts which do this are pretty darned
good - it's fairly easy to accidentally leave junk like this in strings
when hacking stuff together in scripting languages.
Good points!
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 756ccaf..ff2ca5c 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -163,11 +163,14 @@ int strict_strtoul(const char *cp, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res)
char *tail;
unsigned long val;
size_t len;
+ char tmp[32];
*res = 0;
len = strlen(cp);
if (len == 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (len > snprintf(tmp, "%ld", ULONG_MAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
val = simple_strtoul(cp, &tail, base);
if (tail == cp)
And here we're doing a check for that overflow, yes?
- We don't need tmp[]. vsnprintf(NULL, ...) can be used to query the
length of an sprintf. See how kvasprintf() does this.
- The strict_strtoul() documentation should be updated?
- The above change affects strict_strtol() too.
- The same change should be made to strict_strtoull() and hence
strict_strtoll()?