Re: [PATCH] Added PR_SET_PROCTITLE_AREA option for prctl()

From: Timo Sirainen
Date: Fri Oct 02 2009 - 22:47:59 EST


On Oct 2, 2009, at 10:01 PM, Bryan Donlan wrote:

On Fri, Oct 2, 2009 at 5:23 PM, Timo Sirainen <tss@xxxxxx> wrote:
PR_SET_PROCTITLE_AREA updates mm_struct->arg_start and arg_end to the
given pointers, which makes it possible for user space to implement
setproctitle(3) cleanly.


@@ -267,9 +267,12 @@ static int proc_pid_cmdline(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)

res = access_process_vm(task, mm->arg_start, buffer, len, 0);

- // If the nul at the end of args has been overwritten, then
- // assume application is using setproctitle(3).
- if (res > 0 && buffer[res-1] != '\0' && len < PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (mm->arg_end != mm->env_start) {
+ // PR_SET_PROCTITLE_AREA used
+ res = strnlen(buffer, res);

Is this check really needed? Surely it's enough to simply state that
behavior if the area isn't null-terminated is undefined.

Well, that depends. I was hoping to use the syscall only once per process. That would allow me to just update the process title whenever I feel like it, possibly hundreds of times per second. This is much cheaper if I don't have to use a syscall every time.

So if I'm setting the PR_SET_PROCTITLE_AREA initially to e.g. 1 kB memory area, without the above code ps will show it entirely regardless of any \0 characters (because parameters are separated by \0).

+ } else if (res > 0 && buffer[res-1] != '\0' && len < PAGE_SIZE) {
+ // If the nul at the end of args has been overwritten, then
+ // assume application is using old style setproctitle(3).
len = strnlen(buffer, res);
if (len < res) {
res = len;

Might want to fix the bug later on in that function while you're in
here - the second access_process_vm call is never checked for errors,
but (from my reading) it's possible that the page that the environment
is on could be unmapped between those two calls. The result could
either be a short read (not the end of the world) or a negative value
(error code + small original argument length) passed to strnlen.

Hmm. Originally I thought it would have returned only -1, but if it's - errno then I'm beginning to wonder if this is a security hole. If the original res is small enough, and it looks like it can be, that code could get res to negative, i.e. unlimited. But I can't follow the code right now if it also means that userspace can read tons of data or if it gets caught by some "< 0" check.

That said, come to think of it, I'm not actually sure if this prctl
stuff is strictly necessary. Wouldn't it be enough for glibc to copy
the environment somewhere safe, and then have the kernel guarantee a
full PAGE_SIZE between arg_start and env_end, even if this means
padding out the environment? The process could then measure to make
sure it has this much space (in case of running on an old kernel) by
testing the difference between arg_start and the top of the stack, or
an auxiliary vector could be passed down from the kernel with the
maximum proctitle length.

This would get around the potential "not enough space" problem, but not really the ugliness. I can't really think of other potential problems with it right now, but my main concern is actually getting setproctitle() to glibc. Based on Ulrich's previous reply to me I don't know if he'd be willing to accept that solution: http://sources.redhat.com/ml/libc-alpha/2009-10/msg00000.html
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/