Re: [PATCH v2] sanitize task->comm to avoid leaking escape codes

[KOSAKI Motohiro]

> On Tuesday, June 29, 2010 08:16:08 pm KOSAKI Motohiro wrote:
> > > For the audit system, we want the real, unsanitized task->comm. We record
> > > it  in a special format to the audit logs such that unprintable
> > > characters are included. We want it exactly this way for certification
> > > purposes as well as forensic evidence if someone was playing games. If
> > > you do sanitize it for other areas of the kernel, please give us a way
> > > to get the unsanitized text.
> > 
> > Probably this mail is offtopic. I think audit is unrelated with this
> > discusstion. because when  forensic, admins shouldn't believe task->comm
> > at all. because 1) no path information, perhaps "ls" might mean
> > "/home/attackers-dir/evil-script/ls" 2) easily obscured by
> > prctl(PR_SET_NAME).
> 
> No, its on-topic and we want that information unchanged.

Why?
I think I've described why admins should't see task->comm during forensic. Do you
disagree this? or Do you have another viewpoint?

Can you help us clarify your point?

> > That said, audit have to logged following two point if task name is
> > necessary. 1) exec
> > 2) prctl(PRT_SET_NAME)
> > 
> > Thought ?
> 
> The audit system is capable of grabbing that information, too.

ok. thanks good information :)


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