[PATCH] Restrict unprivileged access to kernel syslog

[Dan Rosenberg]

The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful
during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap
addresses.  Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or
thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful
debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that
prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog.

This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the
dmesg_restrict sysctl.  When set to "0", the default, no restrictions
are enforced.  When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read
the kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt |   11 +++++++++++
 include/linux/kernel.h          |    1 +
 kernel/printk.c                 |    2 ++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 |    9 +++++++++
 security/commoncap.c            |    2 ++
 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 3894eaa..c6bac30 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - core_uses_pid
 - ctrl-alt-del
 - dentry-state
+- dmesg_restrict
 - domainname
 - hostname
 - hotplug
@@ -213,6 +214,16 @@ to decide what to do with it.
 
 ==============================================================
 
+dmesg_restrict:
+
+This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented 
+from using dmesg(8) to view messages from the kernel's log
+buffer.  By default, it is set to (0), resulting in no 
+restrictions.  When set to (1), users must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+to use dmesg(8).
+
+==============================================================
+
 domainname & hostname:
 
 These files can be used to set the NIS/YP domainname and the
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 450092c..f0d0088 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ extern bool printk_timed_ratelimit(unsigned long *caller_jiffies,
 				   unsigned int interval_msec);
 
 extern int printk_delay_msec;
+extern int dmesg_restrict;
 
 /*
  * Print a one-time message (analogous to WARN_ONCE() et al):
diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c
index b2ebaee..99b1ec3 100644
--- a/kernel/printk.c
+++ b/kernel/printk.c
@@ -261,6 +261,8 @@ static inline void boot_delay_msec(void)
 }
 #endif
 
+int dmesg_restrict = 0;
+
 int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
 {
 	unsigned i, j, limit, count;
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index c33a1ed..b65bf63 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -704,6 +704,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 	},
 #endif
 	{
+		.procname	= "dmesg_restrict",
+		.data		= &dmesg_restrict,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
+	{
 		.procname	= "ngroups_max",
 		.data		= &ngroups_max,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof (int),
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 5e632b4..04b80f9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -895,6 +895,8 @@ int cap_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
 {
 	if (type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN && from_file)
 		return 0;
+	if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
 	if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
 	     type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;


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