Re: [PATCH] Fix dmesg_restrict build failure withCONFIG_EMBEDDED=y and CONFIG_PRINTK=n
From: Kees Cook
Date: Sat Nov 13 2010 - 21:46:26 EST
On Sat, Nov 13, 2010 at 09:50:22AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> So I would suggest guarding the whole thing, and just returning 0 if
> CONFIG_PRINTK isn't set. Or preferably just move the dmesg_restrict
> test into do_syslog, and stop playing stupid games with
> "security_syslog()", which actually goes away if you disable the you
> disable CONFIG_SECURITY.
>
> SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT is totally independent of CONFIG_SECURITY, so
> doing it in security_syslog() was a bug to begin with.
>
> Or we should make SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT _depend_ on CONFIG_SECURITY,
> and move it entirely into security/commoncap.c, and not pollute
> kernel/printk.c at all with it.
It seems saner to put it in commoncaps to me, but either way, it must happen
after the from_file and OPEN test or it will break /proc/kmesg readers who
open and drop privs (as done with sysklogd, etc).
> + if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
>...
> {
> if (type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN && from_file)
> return 0;
> - if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> - return -EPERM;
i.e.
if (dmesg_restrict && (!from_file || type == SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team
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