Re: [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers

[Ingo Molnar]

* Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> +kptr_restrict:
> +
> +This toggle indicates whether restrictions are placed on
> +exposing kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces.  When
> +kptr_restrict is set to (0), the default, there are no
> +restrictions.  When kptr_restrict is set to (1), kernel pointers
> +printed using the %pK format specifier will be replaced with 0's
> +unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG.  When kptr_restrict is set to
> +(2), kernel pointers printed using %pK will be replaced with 0's
> +regardless of privileges.

Hm, why is it off by default? Is there some user-space regression that is caused by 
this?

We really want good security measures to be active by default (and to work by 
default) - they are not worth much if they are not.

Thanks,

	Ingo
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