Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Make it easier to harden /proc/

[Richard Weinberger]

On Wed, 16 Mar 2011 23:41:36 -0700, Kees Cook <kees.cook@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 16, 2011 at 02:17:39PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Richard Weinberger <richard@xxxxxx> writes:
>> 2> Am Mittwoch 16 MÃrz 2011, 21:45:45 schrieb Arnd Bergmann:
>> >> On Wednesday 16 March 2011 21:08:16 Richard Weinberger wrote:
>> >> > Am Mittwoch 16 MÃrz 2011, 20:55:49 schrieb Kees Cook:
>> >> > > On Wed, Mar 16, 2011 at 08:31:47PM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>> >> > > > When containers like LXC are used a unprivileged and jailed
>> >> > > > root user can still write to critical files in /proc/.
>> >> > > > E.g: /proc/sys/kernel/{sysrq, panic, panic_on_oops, ... }
>> >> > > >
>> >> > > > This new restricted attribute makes it possible to protect such
>> >> > > > files. When restricted is set to true root needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>> >> > > > to into the file.
>> >> > >
>> >> > > I was thinking about this too. I'd prefer more fine-grained control
>> >> > > in this area, since some sysctl entries aren't strictly controlled by
>> >> > > CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. mmap_min_addr is already checking CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
>> >> > >
>> >> > > How about this instead?
>> >> >
>> >> > Good Idea.
>> >> > May we should also consider a per-directory restriction.
>> >> > Every file in /proc/sys/{kernel/, vm/, fs/, dev/} needs a protection.
>> >> > It would be much easier to set the protection on the parent directory
>> >> > instead of protecting file by file...
>> >>
>> >> How does this interact with the per-namespace sysctls that Eric
>> >> Biederman added a few years ago?
>> >
>> > Do you mean CONFIG_{UTS, UPC, USER, NET,}_NS?
>> >
>> >> I had expected that any dangerous sysctl would not be visible in
>> >> an unpriviledge container anyway.
>> >
>> > No way.
>> > That's why it's currently a very good idea to mount /proc/ read-only
>> > into a container.
>>
>> However it is in the architecture.  The problem is that the user
>> namespace is not finished.  Once finished even root with all caps in a
>> container will have no more permissions than the unprivileged user that
>> created the user namespace.
>>
>> Essentially the change is to make permissions checks become a comparison
>> of the tuple (user_ns, uid) instead of just comparisons by uid.  If we
>> want to fix permission problems with proc and containers please let's
>> focus on the completing the user namespace.
> 
> I actually think these are not mutually exclusive. Right now /proc/sys is
> filled with ways to gain caps as a reduced-privilege uid 0 user. I don't
> think containers are the only place where we want to be limiting /proc/sys.
> (For example, core_pattern and modprobe entries can both be written by
> root, regardless of cap, which can be directed to run arbitrary commands
> with full caps. And yes, that's also being fixed separately, it's just an
> example.)
> 
> I'd still like to see the sysctl table expanded to include caps to test.

I agree with you.
Every writable file in /proc/ should have a check for at least one cap.

 
> -Kees

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