Re: procfs: boot- and runtime configurable access mode for/proc/<pid> dirs

[Al Viro]

On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 08:18:54PM +0100, Daniel Reichelt wrote:
> Well, my patch is about modes of the pid-dirs themselves, not their
> contents. And it changes procfs' behaviour about modes both on initial
> creation and during revalidation on access. However flattening all the
> piddir's entries DOES pose a security risk. Have a look at the
> "traditional behaviour": piddir world-readable, however e.g.
> <pid>/environ isn't. Often it's a workaround for broken software to
> specify a password within an environment variable instead of by cmdline.
> Since up until now all processes including their full cmdlines are
> visible to everyone, environ must be considered more sensitive than a
> cmdline.

Bull.  /proc/<pid>/foo contents is sensitive, your patch doesn't do
you any good.  fork(), open /proc/<child's PID>/foo in parent, then
exec suid-root binary in child.  At that point mode_t of any files
or directories does not matter anymore.

You *must* do whatever access checks at read(2) time for these files.
And if you do that, the checks at open(2) time do not matter.

In particular, /proc/*/environ does ptrace_may_access() on read(2) (with
a race fixed by today's merge, BTW).  It could very well be r--r--r--;
having it r-------- does not increase security at all.
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