[PATCH] [113/275] sctp: Fix out-of-bounds reading in sctp_asoc_get_hmac()
From: Andi Kleen
Date: Wed Mar 30 2011 - 17:44:53 EST
2.6.35-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit 51e97a12bef19b7e43199fc153cf9bd5f2140362 upstream.
The sctp_asoc_get_hmac() function iterates through a peer's hmac_ids
array and attempts to ensure that only a supported hmac entry is
returned. The current code fails to do this properly - if the last id
in the array is out of range (greater than SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX), the
id integer remains set after exiting the loop, and the address of an
out-of-bounds entry will be returned and subsequently used in the parent
function, causing potentially ugly memory corruption. This patch resets
the id integer to 0 on encountering an invalid id so that NULL will be
returned after finishing the loop if no valid ids are found.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@xxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/sctp/auth.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Index: linux-2.6.35.y/net/sctp/auth.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.35.y.orig/net/sctp/auth.c 2011-03-29 22:51:23.475122499 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.35.y/net/sctp/auth.c 2011-03-29 23:03:00.538286398 -0700
@@ -543,16 +543,20 @@
id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
/* Check the id is in the supported range */
- if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
+ if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) {
+ id = 0;
continue;
+ }
/* See is we support the id. Supported IDs have name and
* length fields set, so that we can allocated and use
* them. We can safely just check for name, for without the
* name, we can't allocate the TFM.
*/
- if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name)
+ if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name) {
+ id = 0;
continue;
+ }
break;
}
--
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