Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot

[Ingo Molnar]

* Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Just to play devil's advocate, how is it easier for a local 
> attacker to figure out where kernel internals are if it's been 
> relinked vs. randomized at load time, assuming we follow through on 
> fixing the info leaks?

Well, 'fixing the info leaks' will obfuscate previously useful files 
such as /proc/kallsyms ...

That's one of the advantages of randomization: it allows us to expose 
RIPs without them being an instant information leak.

Thanks,

	Ingo
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