Re: [PATCH 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe

[Oleg Nesterov]

On 01/15, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs.  If no_new_privs,
> then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot.
>
> ...
>
> +	if (!(current->no_new_privs && !is_chrooted) &&
> +	    !capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))

I must have missed something. How no_new_privs can help if fs->users != 1 ?

Oleg.

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